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[1273] 
Uncommon Approaches to Commons 
Problems: Nested Governance Commons and 
Climate Change† ‡ 
Blake Hudson* and Jonathan Rosenbloom** 
Natural capital resources crucial to combatting climate change are potentially subject to 
tragic overconsumption absent a requisite degree of vertical government regulation of 
resource appropriators and/or horizontal collective action among resource appropriators. 
In federal systems, these vertical and horizontal approaches may (or may not) take place 
in any one of four scales—local, state, national, and global—“nested” one within another. 
Prior research has described how natural capital in federal systems of government, 
though privatized and/or subject to government regulation, may nonetheless remain in a 
tragic plight due to the allocation of governance authority in federal systems—an 
allocation that may or may not legally entrench the commons dynamic. This Article 
builds on that research to present a clearer picture of the complexity of natural capital 
resource commons and does so by first deconstructing the nested commons scales and 
describing for the first time a number of legal authority and political action scenarios that 
may either resolve natural capital commons dilemmas or facilitate commons tragedies 
within the scales of a federal governance structure. The Article then details the 
“divergent” vertical regulatory and horizontal collective action approaches to managing 
climate-crucial natural capital within each scale. The Article concludes by pointing 
toward future scholarship exploring how these “divergent” approaches within scales can 
become “convergent” by taking into account both legal constraints that may exist on 
vertical regulation across scales as well as geopolitical circumstances positively or 
negatively impacting political action within scales. This convergent approach encourages 
the proper management of natural capital resources by more fully accounting for the 
complexities of the federal governance commons. 
 
 † This Article is dedicated to the memory and scholarship of Elinor Ostrom, who inspired this 
work and many others during her long and impactful career. 
 ‡ For his comments and insights, we wish to thank Professor Jerry Anderson. For his excellent 
research assistance we also wish to thank John Remus, Drake University Law Student. Finally, we wish to 
thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their wonderful efforts, suggestions, and edits. 
 * Associate Professor, Joint Appointment, LSU Law Center and LSU School of the Coast and 
Environment, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. I am exceedingly grateful to my co-author, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, for being a tremendous partner in this project. 
 ** Associate Professor, Drake University Law School. I would also like to thank my co-author, 
Blake Hudson, for being a great resource of information and for making this project an enjoyable one. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Content 
Commons resources are at risk of being tragically over-consumed 
absent some mechanism to adjust the potential self-interested rationality 
of commons users. Scholars have thoroughly analyzed three primary 
mechanisms that may be used to rein in the potential rationality of 
commons appropriators: (1) government regulation, (2) private property 
rights, and (3) the “successful collective action” model developed by 2009 
Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom. These mechanisms are implemented in 
a variety of ways. Some natural resources are subject almost exclusively to 
a private property rights solution, while others are owned or managed 
exclusively by the government. Other resources are both privatized and 
subject to government oversight in their management. Yet others may 
constitute the purest form of a commons, subject neither to private 
property rights nor government regulation, being managed directly by a 
common pool of users. 
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While appropriators of resources may certainly self-regulate and act 
against rational self-interest by altruistically managing the resources over 
which they maintain control in a sustainable manner, appropriators often 
act in their rational self-interest in the absence of a suitable degree of 
higher-level government intervention (“vertical coordination”) or 
purposeful, coordinated collective action with other horizontally situated 
actors (what we also refer to throughout this Article as “self-
coordination”).1 Such is the case in the United States for many types of 
resources—or what we also refer to here as “natural capital”—that act as 
either significant carbon sources or sinks and are therefore crucial to 
regulating climate change. Many of these resources, even if privatized, are 
not managed pursuant to a cooperative self-coordinated strategy and may 
not be subject to government regulatory inputs designed to achieve the 
objectives of much needed climate change policy. 
Whether it be forests, terrestrial or coastal wetlands, or agricultural 
resources, a wide range of management approaches may be 
implemented—or perhaps more frequently not implemented—both 
horizontally within levels of government (global, national, state, or local) 
or among private property owners, and vertically across levels of 
government and private properties. These approaches may have 
potentially tragic consequences for natural capital crucial to regulating 
climate change. Assume, for example, that state governments are actors 
appropriating natural capital on one scale of governance—the “national 
scale.”2 The federal government currently maintains no direct inputs into 
the management of 60% of U.S. forests, which are privately owned and 
subject almost exclusively to state regulatory authority. This represents 
the vertical component in which a higher level of government, the federal 
government, manages (or fails to manage) natural capital by regulating 
resource appropriation within state jurisdictions, situated one scale 
down. Simultaneously, state governments’ forest management policies 
are all over the board on their level of regulatory stringency. While some 
states maintain fairly stringent forest management standards, others, 
particularly in the Southeast, maintain none at all. This represents the 
horizontal component in which actors appropriating natural capital on 
the same scale manage (or fail to manage) natural capital through 
collective action. This description presents a classic tragedy of the 
commons problem, whereby a number of actors (here, the fifty state 
 
 1. Throughout this Article we use the phrases “horizontal collective action” and “horizontal self-
coordination” interchangeably. 
 2. Throughout this Article, we refer to local, state, and national governments as “appropriating” 
resources similar to herders on an open pasture. We do not mean that they are necessarily engaged in 
direct appropriation, though that may certainly be the case. Rather, these governments most often 
facilitate private appropriation activities through the stringency (or lack thereof) of their rules for 
natural capital appropriation. 
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governments) may act as rational herders and appropriate resources 
from a single resource system (forests within the United States), with 
many states doing so without instituting appropriate mechanisms of 
resource management. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the U.S. 
Forest Service projects that urbanization and other factors will remove 
13% of all southeastern forests over the next fifty years, not only creating 
a significant source of carbon but also removing a crucial carbon sink.3 
While this example analyzing one scale of governance helps 
illustrate the classic tragedy of the commons scenario, natural capital 
resources like U.S. forests are subject to a far more complex commons 
phenomenon than the classic case—a complexity that arises out of a three-
dimensional vertically and horizontally integrated resource management 
arrangement that is exemplified by a federal governance structure. Indeed, 
descriptions of commons resources and solutions for their management are 
often oversimplified. In the United States, given that there is very little 
natural capital subject to a pure common-pool arrangement, the resource 
management challenge is often framed, somewhat two-dimensionally, as 
about striking the appropriate balance between the two extremes of 
private property and government regulation, or about preserving the 
values of private property ownership in balance with the values that 
natural capital provides to the public at large. 
One problem with this limited inquiry is that it presumes that once 
private property rights, government regulation, or both, are in place for 
managing natural capital, the commons dilemma has disappeared. This 
presumption is based on the belief that while there were once resources 
open to all and subject to tragic overconsumption, now those resources are 
either privatized or regulated, thereby eliminating the commons or 
associated tragedy. In reality, as described in recent scholarship,4 the 
commons dilemma has not disappeared. Rather, both the entities labeled 
commons herders and the scale of the resource system to which they 
maintain access have simply shifted.  
To see this more clearly, consider an illustration based upon key 
aspects of commons scholarship. Commons analysis is typically framed in 
the context of resource “appropriators” appropriating “resource units” of 
natural capital from a “resource system.”5  
The “scales” that we refer to in this Article contain “resource 
systems” that are geographically bounded by national, state, or local 
 
 3. David N. Wear & John G. Greis, U.S. Forest Serv., The Southern Forest Futures Project: 
Summary Report 26–31, 35 (2011). 
 4. See generally Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons 
Governance, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 1007 (2012); Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State 
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 445 (2012). 
 5. See infra notes 14–17. 
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jurisdictional boundaries. In a federal system of government, there are 
several scales to which commons analysis may be applied. There is the 
national scale in which the national resource system is embedded, the 
state scale in which fifty distinct state resource systems are embedded, 
and the local scale in which thousands of local government resource 
systems and private property resource systems are embedded. 
Furthermore, each of these resource systems is embedded within the 
ultimate scale, the global resource system. As we adjust our focus from 
one type of resource system on one scale to another resource system on 
another scale, it is necessary to adopt a new perspective on both the 
entities considered herders on the commons and the common pool of 
natural capital to which these herders maintain access.  
For example, on the national scale, states are the herders who may 
(or may not) horizontally coordinate their appropriation of resource units 
of natural capital from the national resource system, or whose 
appropriation may (or may not) be subject to vertical coordination by the 
federal government. Yet in shifting to the state scale, we see that local 
governments are the herders who may (or may not) horizontally 
coordinate their appropriation of resource units of natural capital from 
the state resource system, or whose appropriation may (or may not) be 
subject to vertical coordination by the state government (which is now 
the vertical actor rather than the horizontal actor, as on the national 
scale). Shifting scales allows us to see that in the absence of horizontal 
self-coordination or vertical regulatory coordination by a higher level of 
government, private property owners may act as herders on local 
commons, local governments as herders on the state commons, state 
governments as herders on the national commons, and national 
governments as herders on the global commons. 
Another problem presented by the limited inquiry, most relevant for 
the purposes of this Article, is that it seemingly assumes that the interplay 
between appropriators, the commons, and associated resources is 
relatively identical regardless of (1) the scale on which the vertical or 
horizontal management approaches are implemented and (2) geopolitical 
and jurisdictional differences found among resource systems located on 
the same scale. The limited inquiry is again two-dimensional, 
oversimplifying both the vertical and the horizontal approaches to 
commons resource management. This oversimplification fails to fully 
account for legal differences in the various scales that affect the viability of 
vertical or horizontal management approaches across scales and also fails 
to take into account geopolitical differences that may arise among 
similarly situated horizontal actors that can affect their choice of 
horizontal versus vertical approaches.  
Stated differently, there are two important components that 
together constitute a third dimension of federal governance commons 
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analysis. The first component is what we term “geolegal” differences 
across scales of governance.6 These come in the form of legal constraints 
placed on either higher-level governmental entities that prevent vertical 
regulation or on higher- or lower-level entities that prevent them from 
taking successful horizontal collective action for resource management. 
These constraints may arise out of either constitutional or legislative 
restrictions—such as limitations on the federal government under 
Commerce Clause analysis or preemption of local government regulatory 
authority by state governments. The second component comes in the 
form of geopolitical differences horizontally across jurisdictions, whereby 
vertical or horizontal approaches to commons management may be more 
or less viable depending on the political circumstances in similarly 
situated horizontal regions. 
The limited analysis would conclude that the government within a 
single scale vertically regulates to avoid the commons dilemma (the first 
dimension) or that actors horizontally coordinate in a way that avoids the 
commons dilemma (the second dimension), and that both horizontal and 
vertical action are equally viable as applied to, and take place in a 
uniform manner across, that single scale, thus ignoring geolegal 
constraints and geopolitical differences across and within scales (the 
third dimension). In fact, a federal system of government contains 
multiple two-dimensional (vertical-horizontal) scales stacked one on top 
of another, or “nested” one within another. So private property owners 
may horizontally coordinate with each other or be subject to higher 
levels of governmental authority, as may local governments, state 
governments, and even national governments. Furthermore, the 
multiple, two-dimensional scales of government are embedded in a 
three-dimensional structure created by distinct geolegal constraints 
vertically and horizontally across scales and geopolitical circumstances 
horizontally across jurisdictions. The geolegal and geopolitical 
environments being different across scales may influence how the herders 
view and interact with their respective commons and with each other. 
By way of illustration and looking at the state scale in isolation, the 
limited analysis would simply consider whether the State of Alabama 
vertically regulates private forest management (the first dimension) or 
 
 6. Highlighting “geolegal” differences simply recognizes that vertical regulation and horizontal 
collective action do not take place in the same way within different scales due to different legal 
environments. For example, the federal government may be restrained from regulating some activities 
at the state and local levels because those powers are reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment. 
This is a geolegal difference from vertical regulation at the state level, where the same constitutional 
provision does allow the state to vertically regulate lower-level scales regarding that subject matter. 
“Geolegal” also encapsulates different legal circumstances across horizontal jurisdictions. For 
example, there are good arguments that the federal government may vertically regulate certain aspects 
of subnational forest management under the Commerce Clause, whereas the Canadian federal 
government clearly may not under the Canadian Constitution. 
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private foresters in Alabama horizontally coordinate their forest 
management activities (the second dimension), or some combination of 
the two, to avoid the commons dilemma. This two-dimensional analysis, 
however, ignores the fact that different scales might also maintain 
regulatory inputs into forest management, such as the federal 
government or Alabama’s many local governments. Yet the viability of 
these regulatory inputs may be quite variable. The federal government, 
for example, may be subject to constitutional constraints on its authority 
to regulate private forests in Alabama under Commerce Clause analysis. 
Similarly, some states may legislatively preempt local governments from 
setting their own forest management standards in lieu of or supplemental 
to state mandates, while Alabama may encourage such supplemental 
regulation. Furthermore, the two-dimensional analysis overlooks the fact 
that a different balance of vertical regulation or horizontal collective 
action may manifest within the state scale in different regions of the 
United States. A vertical private forest management approach may be 
more likely, for example, in Oregon than in Alabama. In the same way, a 
vertical regulatory approach to regulating land-use planning related to 
urban growth boundaries might be more appropriate in the Pacific 
Northwest, since geopolitics makes such an approach more viable, 
whereas geopolitical considerations make a vertical regulatory approach 
far less viable in the southeastern United States. 
Rather than grappling with this three-dimensional complexity, 
solutions to the primary problems associated with resource management 
are often framed as limitations on a readily identifiable number and type 
of externalities that may spill over jurisdictional boundaries with uniform 
geopolitical characteristics to create isolated environmental harms. Yet 
avoiding commons tragedies in the federal governance structure in which 
private property rights and government regulation are embedded will 
often require an adjustment of horizontal and vertical relationships 
among relevant actors within a single scale—the first and second 
dimensions—and consideration of the geolegal impacts stemming from 
multiple scales nested one within another and the geopolitical differences 
across horizontal scales—the third dimension. When scholars focus too 
acutely on the variety of externalities that exist even in the presence of 
private property rights or government regulation, the magnitude of the 
tragedy of the commons attributes of the problem is diminished. 
Ultimately, the limited, two-dimensional vertical/horizontal analysis 
prevalent in current law and policy debates both overlooks the commons 
attributes of federal systems and ignores the fact that the federal system 
of government results in multiple two-dimensional vertical and horizontal 
relationships nested one within another that may influence the commons 
dynamic. It fails to holistically account for the many government scales 
vertically that may establish rules of resource management for private 
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properties or lower levels of government. Similarly, such analysis fails to 
account for the ways in which multiple actors on different scales (private 
property owners or various levels of government) may work 
simultaneously with other actors on the same plane to tackle commons 
challenges at each scale, and how their efforts may interact with vertically 
scaled governments. Once these considerations are fully integrated into 
commons analysis, we see that depending upon the relationship between 
private property rights and government regulation on any one scale, 
commons tragedies may yet occur for natural capital absent an 
adjustment in the relationship between the multiple, two-dimensional 
scales where horizontal coordination or vertical regulation may occur—
again, nested one within another as depicted in Figure 1. The resource 
management challenge is anything but a two-dimensional balance within 








Importantly, the three-dimensional horizontal and vertical 
interactions themselves, particularly in a federal system of government, 
can act as what may be termed a “nested governance commons” within 
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which natural resource commons are embedded. Within each horizontal 
scale, the rules of resource management allowed by the governance 
framework (what we refer to here as “legal authority”) and the resource 
management actions actually undertaken at that level (what we refer to 
here as “political action”) interplay with the natural environment to 
provide a complete picture of the complexity of the commons, as herders 
may appropriate natural capital from each commons scale and across 
scales with tragic consequences. In the absence of a higher level of 
government maintaining legal authority or exercising political action to 
regulate, or in the absence of legal authority or political action to 
horizontally coordinate with each other, private property owners may act 
as herders within local government commons, local governments may act 
as herders within state commons, states may act as herders within 
national commons, and nations may act as herders within the global 
commons. The overlay of segmented vertical jurisdictions and vertical 
regulatory authority over a myriad of individual horizontal jurisdictions 
creates a nested commons that is especially salient within federal systems 
of government, like the United States, where regulatory governance 
jurisdictions are legally divided both horizontally and vertically. 
This Article builds on and merges prior research by each of the 
Authors, further refining an examination of the complexity and operation 
of this three-dimensional nested governance commons within which 
natural capital is managed. It offers a more precise, theoretical conception 
of commons solutions addressing the nested federal system commons. This 
Article begins to deconstruct the three dimensions by looking primarily at 
the first two dimensions described above: horizontal versus vertical 
mechanisms for managing natural capital commons within successive, 
nested scales. (The further complexities provided by the third, geolegal-
geopolitical dimension will be the focus of future scholarship building on 
this Article.)  
Part I provides a basic background on the tragedy of the commons 
and the resources at which the various mechanisms of commons 
management have traditionally been directed, including traditional natural 
capital crucial to climate regulation. This Part next examines federal 
systems of government within which natural resource commons are 
embedded as a nested governance commons, which in turn may be 
considered a “new commons” resource in the commons lexicon. Part II 
next attempts to “de-nest” the nested federal governance commons within 
which natural resource commons are embedded. This Part dissects the 
cross section at which the natural resource commons and nested 
governance commons meet, and how commons problems may either arise 
or be resolved in the presence of a variety of scenarios depending upon the 
presence of government legal authority, governmental political action, or 
both, within each scale.  
Hudson_19 (Hudson) (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2013 4:34 PM 
1282 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1273 
Part III then provides tangible examples exemplifying the divergent 
(or uncommon)7 approaches that may be implemented within each 
individual, isolated scale to avoid tragedies for natural capital crucial to 
combatting climate change—namely horizontal self-coordination within 
the scale or vertical regulatory coordination by the governmental entity 
the next scale up. Part III’s discussion lays the foundation for future 
research exploring a convergent (or common) approach to addressing 
commons problems. Analysis of a convergent approach to tackling 
commons problems necessarily takes into account the various complexities 
arising at the vertical/horizontal intersection of natural capital commons in 
the context of the third dimension discussed above—the legal and political 
differences across vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the United 
States—which lends itself to a more nuanced analysis. 
I.  Commons Resources and Management 
A. Tragedy of the Commons 
Garrett Hardin’s oft-cited8 Tragedy of the Commons9 has had a 
profound impact on the shape and structure of environmental policy. In 
particular, Hardin’s article has proven to be the genesis of a body of 
commons scholarship that has since evolved to inform key aspects of law 
and policy, economics, political science, and a variety of other fields. 
The Tragedy of the Commons describes a field open to herders of 
cattle, each of whom is grazing in the pasture. This “commons” is “open 
access,” with each relevant actor on the commons (or pasture) maintaining 
the right to use the “commons resource” (or grass) as much as possible and 
with no ability to exclude other actors from doing so. In the Tragedy of the 
Commons, the open nature of the commons allows each herder to make a 
“rational” calculation to continually add cattle to the herder’s respective 
herd in an effort to maximize personal economic gain. Though each herder 
gains the entire benefit of each additional animal, the negative cost of 
overgrazing is spread among all herders—while the commons is open to 
all, the system of natural capital present upon it is closed and limited. The 
tragedy occurs when each herder determines that it is always in the 
herder’s best interest to add more cattle, since individual returns will 
always far outweigh individual costs. Eventually, without some 
 
 7. We do not use the term “uncommon” here to mean low frequency or rarity, but rather to 
indicate that the two approaches we highlight—vertical regulatory coordination and horizontal self-
coordination—have nothing in common with each other, being on opposite ends of the commons 
solution spectrum. 
 8. See Karlson “Charlie” Hargroves & Michael H. Smith, The Natural Advantage of 
Nations: Business Opportunities, Innovation and Governance in the 21st Century 178 (2005) 
(“Hardin’s paper is one of the most cited papers of the last 40 years.”). 
 9. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).  
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coordinating force arising either internally from the collection of 
individuals or externally from an outside authority, each individual’s 
exercise of rational self-interest results in overconsumption of the natural 
capital and ultimately its complete and tragic elimination from the system. 
B. Commons Resource Management, Traditional Natural Capital 
Commons, and Climate Change 
1. Commons Resource Management 
Commons scholars have settled on two key elements that define 
commons resources: depletability and non-excludability. Robert Keohane 
and Elinor Ostrom characterize commons resources as “depletable natural 
or human-made resources from which potential beneficiaries are difficult 
to exclude,”10 while Oran Young similarly describes them as resources 
“used by a group of appropriators that is both non-excludable and 
depletable.”11 Stated differently, commons resources are “natural or 
human-made resources in which (a) exclusion is non-trivial (but not 
necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is subtractable.”12 As a simple 
illustration, the grass resource consumed by one herder is no longer 
available to others (depletable), and it is very difficult to exclude any one 
herder from consuming the resource (non-excludable). 
The environment within which commons resources exist is known as 
a “resource system,”13 which is comprised of “resource units,” which are 
“what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems.”14 Resource 
units “are not subject to joint use or appropriation,”15 meaning that 
appropriators can exclude other appropriators from the resource unit 
itself. Rather, the non-excludability requirement for a commons resource 
means it is exceedingly difficult to exclude other appropriators from the 
 
 10. Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in Local Commons and Global 
Interdependence 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). Duncan Snidal asserts that 
commons analysis “focuses on the provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in 
consumption (like private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods). Standard cases 
are natural resources, like forests or water, where the quantity available is less than the desired 
consumption of potential appropriators.” Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, 
Heterogeneity and Institutions, in Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra, at 47, 50. 
 11. Oran R. Young, The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in Local 
Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10, at 27, 29. 
 12. Steven Hackett et al., Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental 
Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10, at 
93, 95. 
 13. Ostrom cites fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, bridges, 
parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water as examples 
of “resource systems.” See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action 30 (1990). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 31. 
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resource system. As described in prior research,16 a fundamental 
understanding of the relationship between a resource unit and the 
resource system is important for arguments in this Article related to 
scale, which depend a great deal upon how one defines both the resource 
unit and the resource system. Here, for example, a resource unit may be 
defined by private property, local, state, or national geopolitical 
boundaries, and the resource system is the higher-level geopolitical 
jurisdiction that contains those respective resource units.  
Finally, the act of withdrawing resource units from a resource system 
is the act of “appropriation,” while those who withdraw resource units 
from a resource system are “appropriators.”17 Mechanisms aimed at 
preventing tragic over-appropriation of commons resources historically 
have taken one or a combination of three primary forms. On one end of 
the spectrum is government regulation, whereby an external authority 
mandates rules for herder appropriation of the resource and regulation 
of how appropriation occurs. On the other end of the spectrum is 
privatization, whereby an external authority establishes rules for “fencing” 
the commons and allocating property rights. In this way, each herder is 
thought to have a privatized interest in preserving the resource on a 
specific and dedicated portion of property. Highlighting a third 
mechanism, Ostrom argued that neither regulation nor privatization is a 
necessary component of sustainable commons management. Ostrom 
argued: 
One set of advocates presumes that a central authority must assume 
continuing responsibility to make unitary decisions for a particular 
resource. The other presumes that a central authority should parcel out 
ownership rights to the resource and then allow individuals to pursue 
their own self-interests within a set of well-defined property rights. 
Both centralization advocates and privatization advocates accept as a 
central tenet that institutional change must come from the outside and 
be imposed on the individuals affected. Despite sharing a faith in the 
necessity and efficacy of “the state” to change institutions so as to 
increase efficiency, the institutional changes they recommend could 
hardly be further apart.18 
 
 16. See Hudson, supra note 4. 
 17. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 31. Ostrom gives numerous examples of appropriators, such as 
herders, fishers, irrigators, commuters, and “anyone else who appropriates resource units from some 
type of resource system.” Id. 
 18. Id. at 14. Furthermore, Ostrom argues that 
[a]n assertion that central regulation is necessary tells us nothing about the way a central 
agency should be constituted, what authority it should have, how the limits on its authority 
should be maintained, how it will obtain information, or how its agents should be selected, 
motivated to do their work, and have their performances monitored and rewarded or 
sanctioned. An assertion that the imposition of private property rights is necessary tells us 
nothing about how that bundle of rights is to be defined, how the various attributes of the 
goods involved will be measured, who will pay for the costs of excluding nonowners from 
access, how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated, or how the residual interests of the 
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Ostrom argued that advocates of both privatization and government 
regulation are “too sweeping in their claims,” and that “neither the state 
nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain 
long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.”19 
Invoking Thomas Hobbes,20 Ostrom challenged the idea that 
government regulation—the “external Leviathan”—is the “only way” to 
resolve commons problems, as has been argued by some scholars.21 Such a 
presumption has led scholars to recommend that central governments 
control most natural resource management within nations, whereby the 
“central authority will decide who can use the meadow, when they can use 
it, and how many animals can be grazed.”22 Yet central governments often 
do not maintain sufficient information to estimate the carrying capacity of 
commons resources or to design the appropriate penalties to induce 
behavioral change and to implement sufficient monitoring and 
enforcement. As a result, resource management policies are often 
ineffective and result in continued resource degradation.23 It is perhaps no 
surprise, then, that federal systems of decentralized resource governance 
arose to cure central government deficiencies by harnessing the access to 
information maintained by subnational governments and the 
responsiveness of citizens more directly involved in resource appropriation 
and management. 
Ostrom also challenged arguments of other scholars that stringent 
imposition of private property rights is the “only way” to prevent 
commons tragedies.24 Privatization “would divide the meadow in half and 
assign half of the meadow to one herder and the other half to the second 
herder.”25 As Ostrom asserted, however, “each herder will be playing a 
game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than a game against 
another player in larger terrain.”26 In other words, individuals may pit 
themselves against natural capital on private properties, often tragically 
appropriating it and replacing it with human-made capital,27 even if the 
provision of private property rights allows them to exclude other 
appropriators from the property. In addition, a variety of market failures 
 
right-holders in the resource system itself will be organized. 
Id. at 22. 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 21. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 8. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. See id. at 17. 
 24. See id. at 12. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Human-made capital includes “factories, buildings, tools, and other physical artifacts usually 
associated with the term ‘capital.’” Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and 
Sustainable Development, 6 Conservation Biology 37, 38 (1992). 
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and externalities, such as imperfect information, “free-riders,” transaction 
costs, and collective action problems lead to continued environmental 
destruction even in the presence of a private property rights system.28 
As an alternative to these two extremes, Ostrom put forth what might 
be termed a “successful collective action model,” arguing that herders are 
not inevitably locked into a tragic fate and that a variety of case studies 
demonstrate successful collective action to protect resources in the absence 
of private property rights or government regulation. Ostrom noted that 
“the capacity of individuals to extricate themselves from various types of 
dilemma situations varies from situation to situation”29 and that instead 
“of presuming that some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational, 
and others are omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar 
limited capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex 
environments.”30 Ostrom and other commons scholars building on her 
research have provided robust insights into the circumstances31 under 
which groups of individuals have engaged in successful collective action to 
sustainably manage resources in the absence of private property rights or 
governmental regulatory intervention.32 
 
 28. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 533, 538 (2007). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private 
Property and the Common Good (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315 
(1993). 
 29. Ostrom, supra note 13, at 14. 
 30. Id. at 25. 
 31. These circumstances include: (1) the boundaries of both the resource system and the parties who 
may appropriate resources are clearly defined; (2) appropriation and provision rules match (or are 
“congruent” with) local conditions, meaning rules restricting time, place, technology, and quantity of 
resource units that may be appropriated are related to those conditions; (3) most all appropriators have 
collective choice rights allowing them to participate in modifying operational rules; (4) monitors of rules 
and behavior are accountable to appropriators or are appropriators themselves; (5) appropriators who 
violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions; (6) adequate conflict-resolution mechanisms 
are low-cost and may be accessed quickly; (7) the rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions 
are not challenged by external governmental authorities; and (8) appropriative, monitoring, enforcement, 
and conflict resolution activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. See id. at 90. An 
article reviewing ninety-one empirical studies applying Ostrom’s design principles found that 
the principles are well supported. The most trenchant critiques were abstract, rather than 
empirical. This does not mean that the principles are complete; their incompleteness is the 
most important empirical critique we found in the literature. Other factors such as the size 
of user groups, differing types of heterogeneity within or between user groups, and the type 
of government regime within which users operate are clearly important in many cases. 
Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management, 15 Ecology & Soc’y 38, 52 (2010). 
 32. Such groups include communities managing meadows and forests in Torbel, Switzerland, and 
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan, as well as communities managing irrigation systems 
in Valencia, Murica and Orihuela, and Alicante, Spain, and in the Philippines. See Ostrom, supra note 
13, ch. 3. Importantly, many of Ostrom’s design principles “appear relevant to resolve problems of 
international cooperation as well as those at a strictly local level.” Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 10, 
at 2. Nonetheless, Ostrom’s examples currently remain a distinct minority of cases. As observed by 
scholars, “[t]he real world commons problems that Ostrom studies usually involve repeated 
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2. Traditional Natural Capital Commons and Climate Change 
Commons analysis and application of the three commons solutions 
outlined above have traditionally been applied to natural resources, as a 
framework for assessing their management. Domestic and global fisheries, 
groundwater aquifers, oil and gas resources, the atmosphere, wildlife, and 
forests, just to name a few resources, have historically presented a variety 
of commons problems. Of late, the attributes of the atmosphere that take 
on commons characteristics have shifted. Air pollution is the traditional 
conception of “atmosphere as a commons,” when polluters—much like 
Hardin’s herders—appropriate the clean air resource and replace it with 
pollution. Yet in modern times, climate change has given rise to new 
commons attributes of the atmosphere, as aggregated sources of carbon 
worldwide jeopardize an atmosphere that would otherwise adequately 
regulate global temperatures over time.33 
A similar shift has taken place with forest resources, which are 
increasingly recognized as a common-pool resource. Despite the fact that 
forests may be anchored to the soil under the control of individual 
property owners or governments, the aggregated role of forests 
worldwide to act as a carbon sink and regulate the global atmosphere 
make them virtually as fluid and unbounded as fish in the sea. With 
nearly 20% of global carbon emissions resulting from forest degradation 
and destruction on private and government regulated forests in recent 
decades—an amount of carbon greater than that emitted by the 
transportation sector each year34—the forest resource is clearly a 
common-pool resource whose proper management is crucial to 
combating climate change. Even so, as noted earlier, these forests 
resources, even in the United States, are threatened by increasing 
urbanization and other pressures—with the projected disappearance of 
13% of southeastern U.S. forests over the next fifty years providing only 
one example.35 These threats largely result from a forest regulatory 
framework that is inconsistent or even non-existent at the subnational 
level, with extremely limited inputs at the federal level. 
Wetlands provide another example of the carbon sequestration and 
climate change mitigation potential of what increasingly may be 
characterized as common-pool natural capital, notwithstanding private 
property ownership or government jurisdictions. While conventional 
 
interactions among a relatively small number of players who are able to develop subtle institutions for 
monitoring and enforcing a degree of cooperation.” Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Uncommon Insight 
of Elinor Ostrom, 112 Scandinavian J. Econ. 245, 246 (2010). 
 33. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and 
Global Environmental Change, 20 Global Envtl. Change 550 (2010). 
 34. See Erin C. Myers Madeira, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) in Developing Countries 8 (2008). 
 35. See supra note 3. 
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wisdom may conceptualize tropical forest preservation as crucial to 
natural capital-driven climate change mitigation, coastal wetlands in the 
United States and elsewhere are equally if not more crucial. The 
International Union for Conservation of Nature reports that coastal 
wetlands sequester fifty times more carbon in their soil per unit of area 
than tropical forests, and ten times more than temperate forests.36 In 
other words, the preservation of a smaller area of coastal wetland 
sequesters more soil carbon than the protection of a larger area of 
tropical or temperate forests. Empirical studies in California and Florida 
suggest that coastal wetlands offer excellent potential for carbon 
sequestration since their continual accretion and burial of nutrient-rich 
sediments causes them to accumulate carbon over longer time periods 
and at higher rates than other ecosystems.37  
Even so, these wetlands are subject to tremendous threats—many of 
which are related to development activities in the coastal zone guided 
almost exclusively by subnational governments.38 Other threats come in 
the form of industrial and energy development along the coast.39 Many, if 
not a majority of the United States’ coastal wetland areas have already 
been developed,40 with coastal wetland losses accelerating in recent years 
in spite of a technical gain in wetlands in the United States on the 
whole.41 The state of Louisiana loses 6600 acres of coastal wetlands a 
year,42 while coastal watersheds in the Great Lakes, Atlantic Ocean, and 
Gulf of Mexico lost 59,000 acres each year from 1998 to 2004.43 While the 
federal government does maintain a wetland fill permitting program 
under § 404 of the Clean Water Act, it approves a vast majority of 
wetland fill permits, while subnational governments, as with forests, are 
largely failing to preserve these resources. 
 
 36. See IUCN, The Management of Natural Coastal Carbon Sinks 49 (Dan Laffoley & 
Gabriel Grimsditch eds., 2009). 
 37. See Joy B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem Services, 
and Restorability, 30 Ann. Rev. Env’t & Resources 39, 55 (2005); see also Gail L. Chmura et al., 
Global Carbon Sequestration in Tidal, Saline Wetland Soils, 17 Global Biogeochemical Cycles 22-1 
(2003); A.H. Hussein et al., Modeling of Carbon Sequestration in Coastal Marsh Soils, 68 Soil Sci. 
Soc’y Am. J., 1786, 1786–87 (2004). 
 38. See IUCN, supra note 36, at 8–9. 
 39. Coastal La. Ecosystem Assessment & Restoration (CLEAR), Reducing Flood Damage in 
Coastal Louisiana: Communities, Culture and Commerce 2 (2006). 
 40. The United States as a whole has lost over half of its wetlands. See David Moreno-Mateos et 
al., Structural and Functional Loss in Restored Wetland Ecosystems, 10 Pub. Libr. Sci. Biology 1, 1 (2012). 
 41. See generally Susan-Marie Stedman & Thomas E. Dahl, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Admin. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. & U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status and 
Trends of Wetlands in the Coastal Watersheds of the Eastern United States 1998 to 2004 (2008). 
 42. Robert R.M. Verchick, Facing Catastrophe: Environmental Action for a Post-Katrina 
World 19 (2010). 
 43. Stedman & Dahl, supra note 41, at 5. 
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In addition to forests and wetlands, agriculture provides another 
potentially significant carbon sink subject to commons dynamics. Even 
though agricultural lands are privatized, individual herders, not 
surprisingly, appropriate natural capital from their respective pastures 
through the cultivation of the land. They do so, however, in a manner 
with profound implications for the global climate commons. Their 
actions can be either a great benefit to climate change mitigation, if 
agricultural operations tip toward being a sink for greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”), or they can be a significant contributor to climate change if 
agricultural operations tip toward being a source of carbon. Agriculture 
is a significant source of global GHGs, accounting for about 10% to 12% 
of annual global carbon emissions.44 Yet it also has the potential to 
provide a significant GHG sink upon the appropriate adjustment of 
agricultural operations and policies. The agricultural sector can sequester 
large amounts of carbon in soil and crops after a variety of adjustments 
in crop cultivation (rotation, tillage, adoption of organic practices, and 
use of agro-forestry) and other management changes. Studies have 
shown, however, that GHG sink potential in the agricultural sector is far 
below the technical potential.45 
Despite the GHG sink potential of agriculture, governments at all 
levels in the United States are doing very little to directly regulate and 
ensure its use as a sink.46 The federal government maintains a variety of 
incentive-based, voluntary subsidy and other programs that have impacts 
on carbon sequestration, but these are necessarily limited in scope 
(primarily by budgetary constraints) and breadth of impact.47 In addition, 
the federal government maintains few prescriptions regulating 
agriculture. Many federal statutes contain agricultural exemptions, while 
others, like the Clean Water Act, do not regulate agricultural activities 
traditionally considered to fall within the state governments’ land use 
regulatory role, like nonpoint source water pollution.48 Subnational 
 
 44. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 498 (Bert 
Metz et al. eds., 2007). 
 45. Id. at 522. 
 46. Governments at all levels have taken steps to regulate some agricultural uses that have 
indirect effects on GHG emissions and sinks. For example, many state and local governments regulate 
the use of fertilizers and pesticides, several of which, if unregulated, would result in GHGs being 
emitted directly into the atmosphere when the proper land conditions are not met. See, e.g., Minn. 
Stat. § 103E.021 (2012) (limiting the use of certain fertilizers and manure in conservation grassed 
buffer zones); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1427 (2010) (same). 
 47. Blake Hudson, Agriculture and Forestry, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law 
(Michael Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2013). 
 48. Robin Kundis Craig contends that Congress’ operation “within constitutional federalism 
requirements” has caused it to miscalculate the constitutionality of direct federal regulatory inputs 
into nonpoint pollution assumed to be the sole regulatory role of state and local governments. Robin 
Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Regulation, 15 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 179, 179–81 (2000). Craig notes that “[c]omprehensive federal 
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governments in the United States, on the other hand, maintain a wide 
range of tools to regulate agricultural activities, particularly those related 
to their police power to regulate land use activities. These governments 
have passed urban growth boundaries, farmland preservation programs, 
and large lot zoning statutes and ordinances to, for example, help directly 
or indirectly preserve existing farmland. They have also utilized 
agricultural zoning laws to regulate the when, where, and how of 
agricultural production within a municipal unit.49 State governments also 
retain the authority to regulate GHG emissions from agriculture, as well 
as a variety of land use activities that can either act as source or sink of 
carbon. Yet states “have generally refrained from regulating emissions 
from any agricultural sources.”50 The states’ reluctance to prescriptively 
regulate a variety of agricultural activities related to greenhouse gas 
emissions leaves subsidy programs, tax policy, and market-driven 
instruments as the primary means of shaping agricultural policy in the 
context of climate change mitigation at both the federal and state levels. 
As a result, it is perhaps no surprise that GHG sink activity in the 
agricultural sector is far below its technical potential. 
Ultimately, commons resources like forests, wetlands, and 
agricultural lands are subject to traditional commons management 
mechanisms such as private property and government regulation, yet 
remain in a tragic plight—with stark implications for climate change. 
This evidence supports the view that some critical components of the 
commons resource management mechanisms the United States maintains 
are malfunctioning. The inadequate balance of private property rights 
and government regulation in managing resources crucial to combating 
climate change across scales in the United States supports this Article’s 
deconstruction of the nested commons in order to determine where these 
malfunctions are taking place and how they might be corrected. 
C. New Commons Resources and the Nested Governance Commons 
Commons scholarship has expanded over time beyond the natural 
environment to include a variety of non-traditional commons resources, 
such as medical care, parking spaces, sidewalk vending, knowledge, 
government budgets, silence, email inboxes, and presidential primaries.51 
 
regulation of nonpoint source pollution would thus arguably engage the federal government in land 
use regulation—a type of regulation historically viewed as belonging almost exclusively to more local 
levels of government,” and that “because of federalism restrictions, Congress cannot and has not 
forced states to assume any regulatory burden with respect to nonpoint sources of water pollution. 
Therefore, regulation of nonpoint source polluters is left largely to states’ individual regulatory 
discretion.” Id. at 182, 186. 
 49. See Donald B. Pedersen & Keith G. Meyer, Agricultural Law in a Nutshell 356–61 (1995). 
 50. Viney P. Aneja et al., Effects of Agriculture upon the Air Quality and Climate: Research, 
Policy, and Regulations, 43 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 4234, 4236 (2009). 
 51. For discussion of commons scholarship expanding to include presidential primaries, see 
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Each of these newly categorized commons resources is subject to 
rivalrous depletion by non-excludable appropriators, even though they 
do not arise out of traditional, natural environment commons. 
New Commons scholarship continues to expand, with recent research 
describing how a governance structure itself can operate like a commons.52 
This concept is further expanded in the next Part, detailing how the federal 
system of government may operate as a commons, primarily through the 
allocation of governance authority among levels of government and 
between branches of government.53 One of the roles that our federal 
system of government has increasingly assumed, of course, is the 
management of natural resource commons. Yet in our federal system, 
more natural capital governance authority maintained by the federal 
government may mean less for subnational governments, and vice versa. If 
subnational governments, such as the fifty states, maintain more or nearly 
exclusive authority then, by virtue of the governance structure those 
entities are allowed to “roam” on the commons freely: appropriating 
natural capital without federal coordination and perhaps without 
coordinating with each other to ensure non-tragic resource management. 
We see this in the context of land-use planning at the subnational level 
and the resultant urban sprawl that is threatening natural capital crucial 
to climate change. In this way, our federal system of government is a 
nested governance commons that overlays natural resource commons. 
Stated differently, natural resource commons are embedded within the 
governance framework that sets the rules for appropriation and 
management of those resources—a framework that itself may be 
segmented in a way that tracks a commons. Ultimately, though private 
property rights and government regulation are the tools used to manage 
natural resources in the United States (or, traditional commons resources), 
the federal governance structure within which they are embedded and 
implemented may also be considered a new commons, as further detailed 
in the next Part. 
 
Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 899 (2010). 
 52. See Brigham Daniels & Blake Hudson, Our Constitutional Commons (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with authors). Daniels and Hudson describe (in part) how the Constitution establishes a 
governance structure that takes on dimensions of a commons resource. Institutions, like federal systems 
of government, allocate rules of governance among levels of government and between branches of 
government, and allocate citizen rights through rivalrous jockeying over constitutional resources by non-
excludable citizens, states, executives, courts, and legislatures—creating what Daniels and Hudson term a 
“constitutional commons.” See id. The component of the constitutional commons that allocates rules of 
governance for private property among local, state, and national governments may be described more 
generally as a nested governance commons across levels of government. 
 53. See id. 
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II.  Denesting the Federal Governance Commons:  
The Legal Theoretical Framework 
Natural resource commons are multi-scalar, in that resources are 
contained in vertically and horizontally structured governance scales that 
include a complex web of appropriators within each scale and across 
scales. For example, forests are horizontally scaled across the geopolitical 
boundary between the United States and Canada and vertically scaled 
within each of those nations across national and subnational government 
jurisdictions and private properties—with numerous entities playing a 
role in appropriating those resources. But it is important to ask: Precisely 
what is it that makes natural resources multi-scalar? It is not the natural 
environment itself, at least in the primary sense used by governance 
scholars,54 since the biota, absent artificial human divisions and 
consumptive influence, is interconnected in a way that creates a highly 
functional, integrated, unified, and natural scale globally. What makes 
natural resources multi-scalar are the artificial geopolitical boundaries and 
corresponding allocations of governance authority creating the governance 
systems within which natural resources are embedded. This is what 
commons scholars mean when they refer to the potential to scale up 
analysis of local commons to the national and international scales.55 
There are very few open pastures remaining, with governments and 
private property owners controlling most natural resources worldwide. 
And aside from some ocean resources, open-access properties that remain 
are embedded within some country with ultimate governmental authority 
over them if they choose to exercise it. In this way we can see that it is the 
intersection between natural resource commons and the nested 
governance commons where modern resource commons problems arise. 
To understand the complexity and dynamism of the nested 
governance commons, it is important to first break it down to its 
constituent parts. This necessitates analyzing each “nest” as a horizontal 
construct within the vertically nested governance commons, as well as 
analyzing the relationship of each nest with the successive nest up or down 
the vertical scale. Within each nest there are two primary components that 
intersect to determine whether and how natural resources are managed on 
private or government-owned lands: (1) legal authority of horizontal or 
vertical governments to enact regulatory policies, and (2) political action 
on the part of those governments to actually do so. These components 
intersect in a variety of scenarios, the most notable of which we have 
attempted to describe below. (This is, however, by no means an exhaustive 
 
 54. Of course, the global environment is made up of thousands of vastly different ecosystems that 
operate on different biological scales, but the natural function of ecosystems is not scaled vertically in 
the sense that scholars use to describe multi-scalar governance and management of resources. 
 55. See generally Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10. 
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list.) In addition, the scenarios discussed below are applied throughout the 
remainder of this Article to the U.S. federal system, though they could 
certainly be applied to other federal systems of government. 
To begin, let us consider scenarios that avoid natural capital 
tragedies because, first, there are no legal, institutional barriers to natural 
capital management. Second, natural capital tragedies are avoided under 
these scenarios because horizontal or vertical entities, or both, have 
exercised their legal authority to sustainably manage natural capital. 
Management of natural capital resources within each nest may not result 
in tragedy if at least one of five scenarios manifests (depicted as “NT” 
[non-tragic] in Figure 2A below): 
NT-1) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority 
through political action, while entities at the lower level lack 
the legal authority to horizontally coordinate.56 
NT-2) Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, but entities at the lower level 
have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate and 
undertake horizontal self-coordination through political action. 
NT-3) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority 
through political action, and entities at the lower level have the 
legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but they do not 
exercise that authority through political action.57 
NT-4) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that 
authority through political action, and entities at the lower 
level have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate and 
undertake horizontal self-coordination through political action. 
NT-5) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority 
through political action, and entities at the lower level have the 
legal authority to horizontally coordinate and also undertake 
horizontal self-coordination through political action.58 
 
 56. Lower levels of government may lack legal authority to horizontally coordinate because 
higher-level governments have preempted them from doing so or have simply not granted them 
authority to do so, or due to a number of other reasons outside the scope of this Article. 
 57. As discussed in more detail below, for purposes of this Article we refer to the failure to take 
political action as meaning either the failure to exercise legal authority at all, or the failure to exercise 
that authority in a way that resolves the commons dilemma. 
 58. An NT-5 scenario is consistent with recent calls for legal authority and political action at all 
levels of government to address natural capital dilemmas—a type of federalism termed “dynamic 
federalism,” whereby legal authority at any level of government is not impeded by other levels of 
government or principles of constitutional law. Hari M. Osofsky has promoted “diagonal federalism” 
strategies that “incorporate key public and private actors at different levels of government (the vertical 
piece) and within each level of government (the horizontal piece) simultaneously in order to create 
needed crosscutting interactions.” Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2011). For other examples 
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America’s Federal Democracy (Martha Derthick ed., 1999); Barry G. Rabe, Statehouse and 
Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy 1–37 (2004); David E. 
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50 Ariz. L. Rev. 835 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863 (2006); 
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L. 1015 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, State and Local Climate Changes Initiatives]; David R. Hodas, State 
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Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale 
L.J. 1564 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243 
(2005); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural 
Architectures, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 681 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: 
The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1701 (2008); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The 
Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 Ecology L.Q. 615 (2009). 
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Correspondingly, natural capital commons tragedies can result when at 
least one of four scenarios manifests (depicted as “T” [tragic] in 
Figure 2B):  
T-1) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that 
authority through political action,59 and entities at the lower 
level lack the legal authority to horizontally coordinate.60 
T-2) Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, and entities at the lower level 
have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but it is not 
exercised through political action. 
T-3) Higher levels of government have the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that 
authority through political action, and entities at the lower 
level have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but 
also fail to exercise that authority through political action. 
T-4) Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to 
vertically regulate the resource, and entities at the lower level 
lack the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, failing to 
produce either vertical regulatory coordination or horizontal 
self-coordination. This scenario requires more thorough 
explication, as it can play out in more complex ways. In the 
United States, the Tenth Amendment makes it clear that legal 
authority must reside with the federal or state governments—if 
the federal government does not have legal authority to act, 
then the states must have it, and vice versa. As a result, there 
will not be a scenario where both the federal and state 
governments in the United States do not maintain legal 
authority to act. The T-4 scenario, however, could play out 
quite frequently at state or local scales, as well as on the global 
scale. If the federal government, for example, preempts state 
authority to act, then neither the state nor the local 
government maintains the legal authority to act, resulting in a 
T-4 scenario at the state scale. Similarly, if the state 
government preempts local authority to act, then a T-4 
scenario could play out on the local scale, where the local 
government actors and private property owners do not have 
the legal authority to act. A T-4 scenario could also occur on 
the global scale when the state government has the legal 
authority to act and the federal government does not. In this 
circumstance, restrictions on nested governance would be 
operating in reverse, with the federal government not legally 
permitted to horizontally coordinate with other nations in a 
way that binds the states, which in turn prevents it from 
authorizing a global body to vertically regulate via treaty.61 
 
 59. Perhaps they do technically exercise that authority, but they do so in a way that does not 
resolve the commons dilemma. 
 60. Again, due to preemption by higher-level governments, failure of higher-level governments to 
grant legal authority, etc. 
 61. But see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210–13 (1942) (holding that state laws, and 
Hudson_19 (Hudson) (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2013 4:34 PM 


















Before moving to a discussion of the global, national, state, and local 
scales within which these scenarios play out and are nested, we should 
pause a moment to provide three clarifications of this legal authority/ 
political action framework. First, though unlikely from a practical 
perspective, theoretically a tragedy could be avoided within a given nest 
even in the absence of either vertical or horizontal legal authority or 
political action. In this situation, a critical mass of entities within each nest 
could altruistically, but individually, act against perceived self-interest by 
limiting their own use of the resource—but they would not do so in 
 
presumably local laws, are invalid when conflicting with an international treaty). 
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coordination with others, nor would they be directed by higher-level 
governments. This Article is not concerned, however, with the coincidental 
de facto coordination of separate actors, but rather with the institutional 
and legal mechanisms that are needed horizontally or vertically to avoid 
commons resource tragedies. 
Second, this Article is concerned somewhat quantitatively with whether 
commons management institutions are or are not in place and whether 
there are legal barriers to such institutions, rather than with a qualitative 
analysis of policy. As a result, the scenarios presented in this Article are 
focused primarily on the issue of legal authority, though political action is 
certainly a necessary component of proper commons resource management 
both vertically and horizontally. Indeed, we do not suggest that simply 
maintaining adequate legal authority will result in sustainable 
decisionmaking and the proper government exercise of that authority, 
whether vertically or horizontally. For example, there could be authority at 
the higher level of government that is acted upon through vertical 
regulatory action, but in a way that does not address the resource 
management issues and that may even exacerbate the commons 
conditions—i.e., bad policy.  
Nonetheless, a necessary precursor to efficacious political action is 
whether proper institutions are in place to legally facilitate that political 
will in the first instance. This is why we necessarily presume for the 
purposes of conveying the theoretical framework that if legal authority 
exists and political action is taken in the NT scenarios above, then the 
resulting policy resolves the commons dilemma. In the real world, we 
understand that policy actions may be taken but not be efficacious. For 
this reason, in the T scenarios dealing with preemption, for example, we 
do make some qualitative observations—only in furtherance of the 
framework—noting that legal authority may exist at a higher level of 
government and may be acted upon, but in a way that does not resolve 
the commons dilemma. We make this observation in the preemption 
context merely because in the absence of preemption, the lower-level 
government might be able to resolve said dilemma more effectively than 
the higher-level government. So, to provide a clearer conception of the 
framework, we are using the efficacy of political action very much like 1s 
and 0s in binary code—either political action at that level of government 
resolves the commons dilemma or it does not. Given the complexities of 
assessing the relative success of policy, our model is purposefully lacking 
in analysis of policy sufficiency. 
Third and finally, as indicated earlier, this Article purposefully and 
over-simplistically discusses these scales in relative isolation, leaving the 
full complexity of cross-cutting scalar interactions to future research. One 
of the reasons scalar analysis is so complex is because a degree of “scale 
jumping” may occur, as represented by the T-4 scenario above. In part, the 
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Constitution dictates how these scale-jumping interactions occur and acts 
as a gatekeeper62 by identifying what natural capital resources will become 
the subject of a legal authority dispute on the global, national, state, or 
local governance commons. For example, if the Constitution grants the 
federal government authority to regulate certain resources all the way 
down to private individuals, then the federal government may exercise 
that authority, leading to an NT scenario; or it may preempt state, local, 
or private action, creating either an NT or T scenario, depending on 
whether Congress crafts policy addressing the commons dilemma or not; 
or the federal government may operate concurrently with entities across 
those lower scales, leading to an NT or T scenario, depending on whether 
Congress, states, local governments, or private actors craft policies 
addressing the commons dilemma. 
On the other hand, if the Constitution does not grant Congress the 
legal authority to regulate at the state scale and on down, then state 
constitutional law and legislation become the gatekeeper and determine 
the ultimate outcome of a variety of T or NT commons management 
scenarios at those scales. In the same way, lack of national authority in the 
U.S. Constitution can affect T or NT scenarios at the global level, since 
entities at the state or local scales may impede the ability of the national 
government to participate in global scale governance arrangements to 
address commons problems. Furthermore, the coordinated actions of 
every private property owner on the earth, theoretically and however 
unlikely, could resolve the commons dilemma across every higher scale—
jumping from the lowest scale to the highest in resolving the problem. 
Similarly, a global arrangement successfully negotiated and successfully 
implemented in every country on the globe could compel actors at all 
lower scales to address the commons dilemma—thus jumping from the 
highest scale to the lowest. And there are a variety of permutations of 
scale jumping in between. The reality is that these types of cross-cutting 
interactions do not occur within only these two dimensions of vertical 
and horizontal. Rather, they occur in different ways across different 
horizontal jurisdictional and geographic lines. It is this aspect of nested 
governance commons that will be further analyzed in our future 
research. Yet we acknowledge here that we are well aware of this 
complexity. 
We have now established the basic operation of each nest within a 
governance commons, and how each nest may result in tragedy 
depending on the presence or absence of legal authority and political 
action both vertically and horizontally. However, there are multiple nests 
scaled vertically and horizontally in the United States within which 
natural capital commons are embedded. So, to gain a clearer and more 
 
 62. See generally Hudson, supra note 4. 
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precise conception of the nested commons in the United States, we can 
describe each nest as one of four, scaled from units as small as private 
properties to the largest unit we can assess, the globe. As described 
above and further detailed in the Subparts below, the legal entrenchment 
of commons at each scale can arise out of very different legal 
authority/political action scenarios, which are in turn determined by 
matters of simple geopolitics (as in the case of the global commons), 
constitutional law (as in the case of the national and state scale 
commons), or legislative preemption (as in the case of some national, 
state, and local scale commons). On any individual scale, as depicted in 
Figure 3, a natural capital commons may occur (notwithstanding the 
overarching governance commons), and each level may look like the 
following: 
(1) In the absence of vertical inputs by a global governance 
arrangement or horizontal self-coordination among groups of 
nations, national governments may act as individual herders on 
the natural capital “pasture” that is the globe. The resource unit is 
natural capital within a single nation, while the resource system is 
global natural capital. 
(2) In the absence of vertical inputs by the federal government or 
horizontal self-coordination with each other, state governments 
may act as individual herders on the natural capital “pasture” 
defined by national jurisdictional boundaries. The resource unit is 
natural capital within a single state, while the resource system is 
natural capital within the collection of local governments that 
make up the state. 
(3) In the absence of vertical inputs from state governments or 
horizontal self-coordination with each other, local governments 
may act as individual herders appropriating natural capital from 
the “pasture” defined by state jurisdictional boundaries. The 
resource unit is natural capital within a single local government, 
while the resource system is natural capital within the collection of 
local governments that make up the state. 
(4) In the absence of vertical inputs from local governments or 
horizontal self-coordination with each other, private property 
owners act as individual herders appropriating natural capital 
from the “pasture” defined by local government jurisdictional 
boundaries. The resource unit is natural capital on private 
property, while the resource system is natural capital within the 
collection of private properties that exist within local government 
boundaries.63 
 
 63. This Article breaks down local governments on the basic line between state level governments 
and general purpose incorporated subdivisions that are self-governed, including cities, towns, villages, 
counties (boroughs and parishes), but not special purpose or quasi-public entities (such as housing 
authorities). Obviously, depending on jurisdiction, there may be towns or cities embedded within 
townships embedded within counties, and so on and so forth. But the basic operation of the nest is the 
same, and what we call “local governments” suffice for the time being as covering all the different 
categories and subcategories of sub-state actors that may be found. 
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Figure 3 
 
While each level in isolation may constitute a typical natural resource 
commons, whereby individual appropriators appropriate resource units 
from the resource system, it is the integration of each scale within a federal 
system of government that creates multi-scalar natural resource 
management issues. Stated differently, it is the synergy between the 
natural environment and the system of governance designing rules for its 
management that presents the complete picture of the commons. In this 
way, federal systems of government can operate as a nested governance 
commons that overlays the natural environment—thus adding another 
layer of complexity to the management approaches needed to address 
climate change. 
A. Global Governance Commons 
On the global scale, nations are the individual actors appropriating 
natural capital resource units from the global commons. In this way, we 
can look at the legal policies of each nation regarding climate regulating 
natural capital protection as a representation of either rational or 
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irrational herder mentality on the global commons. Individual nations 
may act alone to curb emissions or establish carbon sinks in forests, 
wetlands, and agriculture. Yet there are strong disincentives from doing so, 
not the least of which is that other nations will continue to grow their own 
GHG-based economies by free riding on the GHG emissions limitation-
sink preservation efforts of others. So to achieve the most viable climate 
change response on the global scale, individual nations must either 
cooperatively and horizontally coordinate with each other, agreeing to 
domestically adjust land use, forest, wetland, agricultural, or other 
resource policies crucial to combatting climate change, or they must cede 
sovereignty to an international treaty or other protocol establishing rules 
of governance that will vertically coordinate those activities through 
standards set at the international level and implemented by nations. 
The global governance commons has the potential to devolve into a 
tragedy because—absent a legally binding treaty or other arrangement—
there is no vertical legal authority at the global level to coordinate the 
activities of nations engaged in natural capital appropriation, and therefore 
whether a natural capital commons exists depends entirely on the 
individual (or incidental collective) political action of nations to harness 
their authority for natural capital management. At first glance it might 
appear that horizontal self-coordination among nations and nations 
coming together to craft a global vertical regulatory structure are one and 
the same, since the creation of vertical regulatory structure at the global 
level obviously requires horizontal coordination. Yet nations can go about 
crafting global resource management regimes in different ways.  
For instance, nations might cede all or a degree of sovereignty over 
domestic resource management to an international body that crafts rules 
for nations to implement domestically, which results in more direct and 
robust vertical authority.64 Or perhaps rules are developed directly by 
nations engaged in protocol negotiation, and any nation who wishes to be 
a part of the protocol, at the present or in the future, must abide by those 
rules and standards. On the other hand, individual nations may not cede 
rulemaking authority to an international body or an international protocol, 
but may agree to horizontally coordinate with other nations to utilize 
domestic rule making, with a degree of flexibility, to meet certain resource 
management targets. The treaty may still be binding, as with a vertical 
regulatory structure, but in a true horizontal collaboration the individual 
 
 64. This mode of vertical regulatory coordination at the international level is termed an 
“international delegation,” defined as “a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body 
to make decisions or take actions.” Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International 
Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (2008); see Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the 
Values of Federalism, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 93, 93 n.1 (2008) (“[I]nternational delegations take 
many different forms, leaving nations and subnational units of nations (for example, U.S. states) with 
varying degrees of regulatory control regarding the subject matter of the delegation.”). 
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nations—and not a third party—are responsible for monitoring, 
sanctioning, and adjudicating disputes regarding other nations’ 
appropriation of the resource.  
In addition, horizontal governance at the international level can occur 
in a variety of other ways that are not driven by global standards or targets. 
Horizontal collective action may involve far fewer nations than would a 
legally binding global governance regime, as a handful of nations may 
come together to craft rules for localized governance problems that cross 
only some national jurisdictional boundaries. The United States and 
Mexico coordinating access to Colorado River resources or the United 
States and Canada coordinating management of North American 
migratory birds would be examples.65 Even though vertical regulatory 
coordination and horizontal self-coordination at the global level can be 
differentiated in some ways, at some point the two begin to merge due to 
the ceiling that the globe places on governance: Unlike at lower levels of 
government, the vertical and horizontal actors on the global scale are on 
the same plane. 
The presence of a global governance arrangement that establishes 
binding rules at the international level can result in proper commons 
resource management at the national scale, even if nations are not 
individually engaged in domestic rule creation (absent the global push) 
due to collective action, free rider, or other commons problems. This 
might be characterized as NT-3 in Figure 2B, at least in part. Yet, since 
ceding authority to an international body requires some degree of 
horizontal collective action, it might also be characterized in part as an 
NT-5 scenario. This is where the merger described above becomes 
apparent. Similarly, in the absence of rules arising out of an international 
body and implemented through domestic law, nations may choose to 
harness their domestic authority to craft their own rules aimed at hitting 
a resource management target and therefore manage natural capital in a 
non-tragic way (scenario NT-2). On the other hand, the lack of a global 
governance arrangement can devolve into a tragedy if countries do not 
individually take political action pursuant to their legal authority 
(scenario T-2). Or, perhaps a state or provincial government has the 
constitutional authority to act and the federal government does not, 
which results in the federal government not being legally permitted to 
horizontally coordinate with other nations and in turn prevents it from 
authorizing a global body to vertically regulate via treaty (scenario T-4). 
 
 65. We also recognize that a vertical regulatory regime could exist among a handful of nations 
where those nations cede authority to a third party or newly created entity. See, e.g., Council of Great 
Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water 
Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, at 1; Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to 
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448 (1909); The 
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
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Ultimately, the global governance commons exists merely as a matter 
of geopolitics. There is no global constitution that may be amended to 
grant global regulatory authority to a global congress or other legislative 
body. There is also no global enforcement mechanism to ensure 
compliance, short of military action. This is in sharp contrast to the 
deference that subnational governments in the United States, for example, 
maintain for national authority—even if initially defiant, states will 
ultimately comply with federal mandates if upheld as constitutional in the 
courts, even if the National Guard must intervene. In contrast, 
international law relies solely on the political action of nations to self-
regulate natural capital appropriation, voluntarily coordinate with other 
nations to do so through global agreements on targets, or voluntarily 
relinquish authority and at least some degree of sovereignty to meet 
standards set at the international level. As a result, depletable global 
natural capital is subject to rivalry by non-excludable nations, none of 
which may be legally excluded from appropriating the resource unit of 
natural capital over which they maintain control from the global resource 
system. In this way, the global governance commons operates very much 
like a national governance commons wherein the national government 
maintains no constitutional authority to coordinate subnational natural 
capital appropriation. 
B. National Governance Commons 
At the national scale, the commons dilemma shifts, with the group of 
rational, self-interested actors changing from national governments to state 
governments. State governments become herders on the national 
commons, and avoiding a tragedy of the commons requires self-
coordination among the states or vertical coordination arising from federal 
government regulation. 
In the United States, natural capital commons are subject to private 
property rights or government regulation, and most frequently both. 
Management of these resources takes place within a federal system of 
government that contains designed, vertical, multi-scalar divisions of 
governance authority. The federal form of governance in the United States 
maintains dimensions of a commons that currently manifest in the text of 
the Constitution and, as described by recent research, one of these 
dimensions consists of rules of governance related to the allocation and 
division of governance authority between branches of government or 
between levels of government.66 This allocation is in a constant state of 
rivalry, as demonstrated by two examples in particular: the continued 
wrangling over the scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause 
 
 66. See generally Daniels & Hudson, supra note 52. 
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and the related, subsidiary issue of complete preemption by the federal 
government of subnational regulatory authority. 
Regarding the scope of federal authority under the Commerce 
Clause, more authority granted to subnational governments means less 
for the federal government and vice versa (meaning there is rivalry over 
a depletable resource). For example, state governments may wish to 
maintain exclusive regulatory authority over areas traditionally governed 
solely by states. So any expansion of federal power that allows either 
concurrent regulation by the federal government, or perhaps even 
preemption, results in a depletion of state government authority to 
exclusively regulate (or authority to see those activities remain 
unregulated, as they may prefer). In addition, it is very difficult to 
exclude any commons user (the executive, legislature, judiciary, states, 
and citizenry) from accessing the institutions that shape the 
appropriation of that authority over time. In this way, the federal system 
can be seen as a governance commons that overlays the natural resource 
commons it was intended to govern. 
So let us place the national governance commons in the context of 
the scenarios discussed above. The presence of federal legal authority 
over subnational resource appropriation (via the Commerce Clause) can 
result in proper commons resource management at the national scale if 
the national government exercises political action pursuant to that 
authority to coordinate subnational activities in the absence of 
subnational action (scenario NT-3), or completely in lieu of subnational 
action through preemption (scenario NT-1). Similarly, in the absence of 
federal Commerce Clause authority, subnational entities may choose to 
harness their authority to manage natural capital in a non-tragic way 
(scenario NT-2), or they may do so when the federal government 
maintains legal authority but chooses not to politically act (scenario NT-
4). Finally, both the federal and subnational governments may maintain 
legal authority and both levels exercise that authority through political 
action to properly manage resources (scenario NT-5).67 On the other 
hand, even if the federal government maintains Commerce Clause 
authority, a tragedy may result if it chooses not to exercise its authority 
through political action to coordinate subnational activities at the same 
time that it also preempts the legal authority of subnational governments 
to manage the resource (scenario T-1). Similarly, the lack of federal 
Commerce Clause authority can divulge into a tragedy if subnational 
governments do not act politically on their legal authority (scenario T-2). 
Finally, a tragedy may result if both the national and subnational 
governments maintain legal authority, but each fails to exercise that 
authority through political action to manage the resource (scenario T-3). 
 
 67. See supra note 58. 
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Ultimately, it is the Constitution’s arguable depletion of federal 
authority over some resource management that legally entrenches a 
constitutional governance commons scenario. The Constitution grants 
primary regulatory authority over certain types of natural capital 
appropriation to a vast quantity of subnational governments. Thus, the 
depletable national natural capital is subject to rivalry by non-excludable 
subnational governments, none of which may be legally excluded from 
appropriating the resource unit of natural capital over which they maintain 
control from the national resource system (scenario T-2). Unless 
subnational actors work together to craft sustainable resource 
management rules (scenario NT-2), there is no higher level of government 
with authority to coordinate their activities. It is this vertical overlay of 
potentially rational governance authority that facilitates the potential 
rationality of natural capital appropriators along the horizontal plane. 
Managers of the governance commons (Congress, the judiciary, the 
executive, the states, and the citizenry) can always seek to adjust the 
constitutional structure to redress a legally entrenched commons. 
Congress could pass a statute claiming authority over natural resources, 
the regulation of which was previously considered the sole sphere of 
state governance authority—no legislator is excluded from proposing 
such a statute and legislators do so in rivalry with those opposing that 
appropriation or reallocation of governance authority (which would, of 
course, deplete, at least to an extent, the discretionary governance 
authority of the states). A president may then veto the statute, or in the 
alternative sign the legislation to ensure its passage, weighing in either 
against or in agreement with the new appropriation of governance 
authority. Any citizen or state that opposes the statute may lodge a 
challenge against its constitutionality, in rivalry with those citizens or 
states that would see governance authority appropriated in exactly the 
manner Congress chose to appropriate it. But unless managers of the 
governance commons seek to adjust the governance structure in this way, 
natural resources will remain embedded on a horizontal plane within a 
vertical governance structure that legally insulates levels of government 
from inputs by other levels. 
Similarly, preemption by the federal government of subnational 
regulatory authority also may or may not result in commons tragedies. 
Under this scenario, the federal government forbids subnational 
governments from exercising what would otherwise be their 
constitutional authority over natural capital appropriation. It may be that 
this supplanting of subnational control results in better resource 
management, as is arguably the case with certain federal preemptive 
provisions in the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act that supplant state 
or local rules that may conflict with the federal scheme (scenario NT-1). 
Yet under other scenarios federal preemption may result in a supplanting 
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of state or local authority in a way that prohibits the development of more 
optimal natural capital appropriation measures (scenario T-1), as is 
arguably the case in the context of mobile source regulation under the 
Clean Air Act. In the context of climate change, there are a number of 
examples in which state governments sought to address climate-change-
related issues and were preempted by federal law, contributing to 
potentially tragic consequences in the aggregate.68 This result is 
represented by T-1 in Figure 2B, whereby subnational governments do not 
choose to rush toward commons tragedies, but are actually legally required 
to act in a rivalrous manner in appropriating depletable resource units of 
natural capital from the national commons. 
C. State Governance Commons 
As the commons dilemma shifts from the national to state scale, the 
group of rational, self-interested actors changes from state governments 
to local governments. On the state commons, state governments, which 
constituted the potential herders on the national scale, are transformed 
into the vertical regulatory authority. Local governments assume the role 
of potential herders, seeking to appropriate natural capital by growing 
local economies, generating local revenues, increasing the tax base, and 
so on, and doing so by competing with other local governments.69 This 
competition, a form of “race-to-the-bottom” that can lead to lax land-use 
or forest-management standards, for example, results in potentially tragic 
mismanagement of climate-crucial natural capital in the absence of 
horizontal self-coordination among local governments or vertical 
coordination arising from state government regulation. 
As the commons dilemma shifts from the national to the state scale, 
the tussle over legal authority also shifts to a battle between state and local 
governments. The outcome of this tussle is determined almost entirely by 
state constitutional and statutory law.70 Unlike state governments, local 
 
 68. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (holding 
that the Clean Air Act preempted state standards pertaining to new motor vehicle and new motor 
vehicle engine emissions); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663 AWILJO, 
2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempted state efforts to 
reduce global warming pollution). But see Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 
508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (holding that Vermont’s GHG regulations were not preempted). 
 69. A survey of recent scholarship reveals several articles applying a Tragedy of the Commons 
analysis to local governments, including Thomas Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change 
Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 Envtl. L. 1221 (2011) (climate change); Emily C. Powers, Fracking 
and Federalism: Support for an Adoptive Approach That Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory 
Commons, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 913 (2011) (hydrofracking); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s 
LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 285 (2010) (land 
use); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 477 
(2011) (renewables and urban sprawl). 
 70. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174–80 (1907) (holding that local governments 
are creatures of state law and that the U.S. Constitution does not protect local governments from state 
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governments—the rational, self-interested actors on the state commons—
do not exist under the U.S. Constitution.71 Local governments are a legal 
concept constructed out of state laws and they do not have inherent 
regulatory authority under, or protected by, the Constitution.72 The 
Constitution is relevant on the state scale, however, because local 
governments have only that authority granted to them by the states. As a 
result, the federal government assumption of legal authority to act on the 
national scale, through preemption or otherwise, leaves state and local 
governments without the legal authority to act (on either the national or 
state scale)—avoiding a conflict between state and local governments at 
the state scale (scenario T-4). Accordingly, avoiding a tragedy at the 
state scale when the federal government is the sole governmental entity 
with the legal authority to act on the national scale is dependent upon 
federal action, as neither state nor local governments on the state scale 
have the legal authority to act. 
Alternatively, if on the national scale state governments maintain the 
legal authority to act, either exclusively or shared with the federal 
government, then the potential for a new struggle arises on the state 
commons—a struggle between state and local governments. One example 
of this struggle involves traditional notions of economic pressures as 
described in the Tragedy of the Commons, whereby in the absence of state 
government regulatory restrictions, local governments are engaged in the 
oft-discussed race to the bottom phenomenon stemming from a 
traditional, natural capital commons structure. The local governments are 
believed to appropriate depletable and non-excludable resources in 
competition with other local governments because of the economic 
incentives in doing so. An alternative description of the commons dilemma 
at the state scale is rooted in the legal pressures that actually influence 
local governments to act rationally. These pressures are frequently 
overlooked and stem from the fact that state law often compels local 
governments to manage natural capital resources in a rational, and thus 
potentially tragic, manner. In particular, local governments are often 
prohibited from having extraterritorial impacts and are limited to 
regulating solely within their borders.73 The combination of multi-
 
government intrusion). But see Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 482–86 (1968) (holding that a 
state may not create a general purpose local government that apportions voting unequally in violation 
of the Constitution); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48 (1960) (holding that the 
Constitution protects individuals from state-created local self-government based on race). 
 71. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Further discouraging local governments from taking sustainable action on common resources 
are damage awards stemming from a finding of an impermissible extraterritorial impact. Cf. Owen v. 
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980) (“The knowledge that a municipality will be liable 
for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for 
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of 
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jurisdictional natural capital resources and limited local government 
authority to regulate those resources creates inefficiencies that discourage 
local governments from seeking innovative solutions to commons 
challenges.74 
There are four potential legal scenarios within a state that inform 
the nested governance commons and influence local government actors’ 
behavior on the state scale.75 The first stems from an early twentieth 
century doctrine—Dillon’s Rule.76 Under this rule a local government 
may act only if the action is expressly authorized by the state, is 
incidental to an expressly stated authorization, or is “indispensable” to 
performing the local government’s tasks.77 Further, any fair, reasonable 
doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts 
against the local government, and the power is denied.78 The remaining 
three state legal scenarios informing the state governance commons are 
commonly referred to as “home rule” laws. Home rule laws vary in the 
amount of autonomy granted to local governments and come in three 
forms: (1) legislative home rule,79 (2) imperio home rule,80 and (3) hybrid 
legislative/imperio.81 Ultimately, all four of these legal scenarios—
Dillon’s Rule and the three types of home rule laws—limit local 
government authority to some degree. 
State preemption laws determine when a local government has 
exceeded its legal authority under either Dillon’s Rule or the three types 
of home rule authority, or when the state government has recaptured some 
of that authority.82 Incorporated into the home rule and preemption 
 
protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.”). 
 74. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 446–62 (discussing state home rule and preemption laws and 
the impact they have on local governments). 
 75. While we recognize that the probability of a state/local conflict and the outcome of that 
conflict is heavily influenced by which of the four state legal scenarios is applicable, an in-depth 
analysis of the four is beyond the scope of this Article, as we are establishing a foundation to 
understand the state governance commons in which to later detail the nuances. 
 76. 1 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911). 
 77. Id. at 448–49. For an example of specific state authorization to act in a Dillon’s Rule state, see 
Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2280 (1997) (enabling local zoning). 
 78. Dillon, supra note 76, at 452–53; see S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
58 S.W. 3d 706, 711 (Tenn. 2001) (applying a narrow view of local authority to act under Dillon’s 
Rule); Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review of Providence, 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961) (same). 
 79. See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. X, § 11. 
 80. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. III, § 5(a). 
 81. See, e.g., Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. 
 82. The federal government may jump scales and also preempt a local law. We explore this jumping 
of scales in more detail in a forthcoming companion piece. Here, we are establishing a foundation by 
isolating the commons at each scale and its relationship to the direct and immediate horizontal and 
vertical forces before exploring the dynamic and multi-layered interaction among scales and commons. 
State preemption of a local law may occur in three ways: (1) conflict preemption, where there is a direct 
conflict between the local ordinance and state law; (2) express preemption, where the state specifically 
notes that it is preempting the subject matter; and (3) implied preemption, where the state preempts a 
subject matter indirectly through prior actions, such as existing state legislation. See Talbot Cnty. v. 
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analyses is an inquiry into whether a particular local action has an 
impermissible extraterritorial impact.83 While state judicial interpretation 
of when a local government is acting extraterritorially may differ, many 
courts “use a finding of extraterritoriality as the basis for the conclusion 
that [a local government] . . . has exceeded the [locality’s] . . . powers, or 
has been preempted by the state legislature.”84 
The combination of Dillon’s Rule, home rule laws, and the judicial 
interpretation of preemption laws coerces local governments to consider 
only the impacts within their jurisdiction. Local government actors are at 
a minimum encouraged, and at most legally compelled, not to consider 
their externalities or to act “rationally,” resulting in a legally entrenched 
commons.85 Because many natural capital resources are not confined to a 
local government’s borders, any benefit that may stem from one local 
government’s irrational protective action to preserve the resource can be 
quickly lost. Therefore, the free-riding actions of neighboring jurisdictions 
discourage “irrational” (responsible) horizontal management of commons 
resources by those jurisdictions that would otherwise do so. Each locality 
is therefore faced with both economic and legal pressure to adopt a 
dominant strategy to benefit its inhabitants—internalizing those 
benefits—while externalizing the costs to the other state common pool 
actors.86 Each locality is reduced to competing with other localities for 
the appropriation of natural resources, including those relevant to 
climate change, such as forests, wetlands, and agricultural resources. 
When more authority is assumed by state governments under strict 
interpretations of Dillon’s Rule, home rule, and preemption laws, less 
authority is granted to local governments and vice versa. In this way, 
state constitutional and statutory provisions formulate a governance 
commons that overlays the natural resource commons it was intended to 
govern at the state level. The presence of Dillon’s Rule, home rule, and 
preemption provisions over local resource appropriation can result in 
proper commons resource management at the state scale if the state 
government acts on its legal authority to regulate local activities 
(scenario NT-1).87 State legislation pertaining to GHG reductions 
 
Skipper, 620 A.2d 880, 886 (Md. 1993). See generally Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W. 2d 486 (Iowa 
1998) (holding county ordinances preempted by state legislature); Richard Briffault & Laurie 
Reynolds, Cases and Material on State and Local Government 406–49 (7th ed. 2009). 
 83. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
1271, 1274 n.19 (2009) (citing Seigles, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d 456, 458) (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)) 
(noting that the court called it “axiomatic” that a local government may not act outside its borders). 
 84. Id. at 1275. 
 85. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 453–61. 
 86. This is not to suggest that local governments do not act in an individual altruistic or collective 
manner. Despite the inefficiencies of acting alone, local governments have been a leading force to 
address many common pool challenges. See id. at 466–68. 
 87. While local governments often control significant amounts of authority, particularly as related 
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enacted in California,88 Oregon,89 and Washington90 represent examples 
of the NT-1 scenario on the state scale, where state governments have 
the legal authority to address climate change, take proactive political 
action to do so, and presumably preempt any local action contrary to the 
laws. Similarly, if a state constitution grants exclusive legal authority 
through home rule or specific constitutional protections91 to local 
governments to manage a resource, they may choose to harness their 
collective action and coordinate with each other to manage the resource 
in a non-tragic way (scenario NT-2).92  
Because a number of natural capital resources, such as wetlands, 
forests, and agricultural resources, are simultaneously managed by state 
and local governments, avoiding a tragedy of the commons could occur 
when (a) the state vertically regulates local activities pertaining to the 
resource in the absence of otherwise legitimate horizontal local 
government political action (scenario NT-3); (b) local governments 
horizontally coordinate in the absence of otherwise legitimate vertical state 
political action (scenario NT-4); or (c) the state vertically regulates and 
local governments horizontally coordinate (scenario NT-5). Local 
government collaborations, such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
 
to land use, waste management, and building codes, many cities do not have the home rule authority 
to act (regardless of preemption laws) on a number of climate-crucial issues, such as energy and 
agriculture, as reflected in scenario NT-1. See generally ARUP, Climate Action in Megacities: C40 
Cities Baseline and Opportunities 4–11 (2011). 
 88. Assemb. B. 32, § 2, 2006 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (Global Warming Solutions 
Act) (establishing GHG reduction goals and a framework for achieving the goals). 
 89. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (Climate Change Integration Act) 
(setting specific GHG reduction goals for Oregon, including reducing GHG levels to 10% below 1990 
levels by 2020 and to 75% below 1990 levels by 2050). 
 90. H.B. 2815, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (implementing GHG reduction strategies 
through trading and vehicle miles traveled). 
 91. One of the most common specific state constitutional protections includes a state ban on special 
commissions. See, e.g., S.D. Const. art. III, § 26 (prohibiting the state from delegating enumerated 
functions over local governments to a special commission). Also common are state bans on special 
legislation. See, e.g., Iowa Const. art. III, § 30 (prohibiting the state from passing enumerated special 
laws). 
 92. We acknowledge that scenario NT-2 is less common than NT-3, -4, and -5, where state and local 
governments share authority. In the majority of cases, courts readily recognize a state’s authority to 
resume control granted to a local government. See People ex rel. Bernardi v. Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 
316, 322–23 (Ill. 1988) (holding that local government exceeded home rule authority when it hired a 
contractor who paid less than state mandated prevailing wage); City of Des Plaines v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. 
Co., 357 N.E.2d 433, 435–36 (Ill. 1976) (striking down a local law concerning noise pollution controls 
because the city attempted to regulate noise from a train originating outside of its borders). However, 
there are instances in which local governments have been authorized to act under general home rule 
constitutional provisions or specific constitutional provisions that insulate them from state legislative—as 
opposed to constitutional—action, thus resulting in scenario NT-2. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton 
Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 273–77 (Ill. 1984) (holding that a local law barring possession of handguns did not 
exceed the village’s home rule power even though it would create a patchwork of different local laws); 
Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107. 111–12 (Ill. 1974) (upholding a local ordinance setting a 
mandatory retirement age for policemen and firemen below the state statute). 
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Group,93 the U.S. Conference of Mayors,94 and Union of the Baltic Cities,95 
represent horizontal collaborative attempts to avoid a tragedy relevant to 
climate change at the state scale. When these attempts are coupled with 
state legal authority but the state does not take political action, then an 
NT-4 scenario can arise. Relatedly, when horizontal collaborations similar 
to these are coupled with state legal authority and political action, an NT-5 
scenario can arise and avoid the tragic overconsumption of resources. 
Conversely, a tragedy may result if the state has not authorized local 
governments to act, and the state fails to vertically regulate local activities 
(scenario T-1). Over the past year, a T-1-like scenario has arisen in several 
states over zoning and natural gas fracturing (or “fracking”). State laws in 
Pennsylvania, for example, have attempted to carve out exceptions from 
local zoning laws for various oil- and gas-related activities.96 In these 
circumstances, local governments are powerless to protect the resource, 
and the state has failed to take action to protect the resource (and in some 
cases, such as fracking in Pennsylvania, has facilitated the consumption of 
the resource). A tragedy may also occur if local governments are 
authorized through home rule or specific enabling laws to manage a 
resource, they fail to horizontally coordinate their activities, and the state 
(1) fails to reclaim the legal authority from local governments (scenario T-
2); (2) is prohibited from reclaiming the authority by the state constitution 
(scenario T-2); or (3) maintains concurrent legal authority and fails to 
regulate through vertical state political action (scenario T-3).97 
At the state scale, a legally entrenched nested governance commons 
results most often from a lack of state political action to vertically 
 
 93.  See C40 Cities Climate Leadership Grp., http://www.c40cities.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) 
(“Acting both locally and collaboratively, C40 Cities are having a meaningful global impact in 
reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks.”). 
 94.  The U.S. Conference of Mayors has produced a document in which 1054 mayors representing 
almost eighty-nine million people have agreed to GHG reductions in a similar fashion to that set forth 
in the Kyoto Protocol. See U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, Mayors Climate 
Prot. Ctr., http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 95. Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (“Union of the Baltic 
Cities is a voluntary, proactive network mobilizing the shared potential of over 100 member cities for 
democratic, economic, social, cultural and environmentally sustainable development of the Baltic Sea 
Region.”). 
 96. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2012) (seeking to preempt local zoning ordinances that 
regulate oil and gas operations). This law was partially struck down in Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 
52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). A number of local coastal communities are experiencing similar T-1-
like scenarios where states are “transfer[ing] authority over armoring from local to state control.” J. Peter 
Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 La. L. Rev. 69, 97 n.127 
(2012) (citing Maryland’s Living Shoreline Protection Act of 2008, Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 16-201 
(Westlaw 2012); Connecticut’s Act Concerning the Coastal Management Act and Shoreline Flood and 
Erosion Control Structures, S.B. 376, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2012)). 
 97. In theory, a T-2 scenario may also exist where local governments are insulated from state 
action, and the local governments fail to take action. As discussed above, a more common scenario is T-3, 
where the state maintains some authority to reassume control or concurrently regulate. See supra note 92. 
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regulate local government activities, a lack of local government collective 
action when authorized by home rule or enabling laws, or a narrow 
judicial interpretation of home rule provisions and the prohibition on 
extraterritorial actions preventing local governments from taking actions 
they otherwise might take. This structure subjects the depletable state 
natural capital to rivalry by non-excludable local governments that may 
either choose to appropriate the resource unit of natural capital over 
which they maintain control from the state if the state does not intervene, 
or may even be compelled to do so by state law. 
D. Local Governance Commons 
At the lowest scale on the governance commons, private sector 
actors compete for vital natural resources most immediately within the 
bounds of the local government in which their property is situated. Land 
use activities undertaken by private property owners who fail to self-
coordinate or who are not governed by local rules for appropriating 
natural capital can remove or mismanage vast amounts of natural capital 
that could be used to sequester carbon, with tragic climate change 
impacts. Urban sprawl, subnational forest management, and wetland 
disturbance/disappearance each constitute valuable case studies of this 
phenomenon. In other words, private property owners are potential 
herders on the local commons in the absence of horizontal self-
coordination among property owners or vertical regulatory coordination 
arising from local government regulation. 
In order to avoid a natural capital commons dilemma at the local 
scale, the local government must have the legal authority to vertically 
regulate, or private sector actors must have the legal authority to 
horizontally coordinate. If neither local government nor private sector 
actors have legal authority to vertically regulate or horizontally coordinate 
due to federal or state preemption of their ability to do so, then the local 
governance commons devolves into a T-4 scenario on the local scale, 
where the vertical and horizontal legal authority are absent, and avoiding a 
tragedy of the commons can only occur by higher-level action. Higher-
level action would require a jumping of scales, so to speak, in the form of 
federal or state vertical regulatory or horizontally coordinated activities—a 
scenario we will further analyze in future research. 
Alternatively, if states maintain legal authority to act on the national 
scale, and an individual state allocates some or all of that legal authority to 
local governments to act on the state scale (through Dillon’s Rule or home 
rule provisions, and without preemption), a tragedy may be avoided at the 
local scale through vertical regulatory action on the part of the local 
government. If private parties are left a degree of legal authority to devise 
their own commons management solutions notwithstanding local 
government regulation, then it may constitute an NT-3 or an NT-5 
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scenario (depending on whether private property owners actually do take 
action, NT-5, or do not take action, NT-3). For example, landowners 
might come together to create a trust or execute formal private land use 
controls, such as private covenants, to protect forests or wetlands.98 They 
might also enter into forest, wetland, or agricultural cooperatives to 
achieve sustainable resource management.99 If local government 
regulation completely preempts private property owner authority, then it 
is an NT-1 scenario. For example, as discussed further in Part III, 
Washington County Maryland’s Forest Conservation Ordinance, which 
requires that developers of projects removing 40,000 square feet of forest 
submit a mitigation plan for approval, arguably represents an NT-1 
scenario at the local scale.100 
It is also possible that the federal or state governments may 
maintain authority to vertically regulate—and that they will do so in a 
way that prevents local governments from also acting—but that allows 
for concurrent, private-property owner horizontal action. This is the NT-
2 scenario at the local scale, where the local government does not 
maintain legal authority but private property owners can self-coordinate. 
Finally, private property owners may of their own accord horizontally 
coordinate for proper commons resource management in the absence of 
otherwise authorized local government regulation (scenario NT-4). 
Conversely, scenario T-1 results when a local government maintains 
legal authority to vertically regulate, but fails to do so and prevents private 
property owners from acting. T-2 results when the state or federal 
governments withhold legal authority from local governments to vertically 
regulate a resource but allow concurrent private property owner action 
that does not then come to fruition. The fracking example represents a T-2 
scenario at the local scale, as local governments have been preempted by 
state authority. Presumably, private landowners still have the authority to 
refuse to allow fracking on their property, but many have not done so.101 T-
3 results when local governments have the legal authority to act—granted 
by the state and not preempted by state or federal authority—but fail to 
 
 98. See, e.g., Working Conservation Easements, Pacific Forest Trust, https://www.pacificforest.org/ 
working-forest-conservation-easements.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (“Working forest conservation 
easements provide private landowners the means to permanently conserve their forests for a variety of 
public benefits while keeping them in private ownership and productive forestry.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Sarah F. Ashton et al., Forest Management in the Interface: Forest 
Cooperatives (2011). 
 100. Wash. Cnty., Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance (2008); see infra notes 154–155 and 
accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2012); H.B. 464, 61st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 
2012) (requiring “uniformity and consistency in the regulation” of fracking); Sub. H.B. 278, 25th Gen. 
Assemb. (Ohio 2004) (prohibiting local governments from determining placement or permitting of 
fracking wells). 
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take necessary political action at the same time that private property 
owners fail to exercise concurrent management authority. 
III.  The Climate Governance Commons: Divergent Approaches to 
Climate Policy Within Each Nest 
Climate change is the quintessential global commons problem. The 
atmosphere, when free from human GHG inputs, maintains a climatic 
balance that slowly shifts over time due to natural causes. But humans 
have rushed the atmospheric commons and flooded it with carbon 
dioxide and other GHGs in a remarkably short time period, geologically 
speaking.102 As with Hardin’s herders, society has done so because 
humans, particularly in the developed world, have received the full 
benefit of taking actions that result in the appropriation of resource units 
by emitting GHGs, while the negative effects of those emissions (climate 
change impacts) are being shared by actors across the entire globe and 
across time (i.e., future generations). 
Part II established a theoretical foundation for exploring how 
different legal authority and political action scenarios within levels of 
government horizontally and across governments vertically complicate 
natural capital management in a governance commons like a federal 
system. The various ways in which those scenarios may play out across 
different parts of the United States, and how those differences may be 
overcome to address climate change in the United States, are the subject 
of future research building upon this Article. This Part, on the other 
hand, will provide examples of how within each individual scale action 
might be taken either vertically or horizontally to protect natural capital 
crucial to combatting climate change, like forests, wetlands, and 
agricultural resources. 
The description of these two approaches is purposefully divergent and 
is oversimplified by design—looking at vertical and horizontal approaches 
within each scale in a vacuum. We take this approach because it is 
necessary to break into constituent parts the two primary mechanisms by 
which commons resources can be managed in federal systems. First, this is 
necessary in order to demonstrate more clearly how both vertical and 
horizontal approaches may be crafted within each scale, which also 
represents the two-dimensional narrative in which the tone of the debate is 
often pitched. Second, we wish to provide a foundation for future research 
focusing on how both vertical and horizontal approaches play out quite 
differently within a third dimension that accounts for different geolegal 
and geopolitical challenges across the United States. These challenges, in 
 
 102. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States 9 (2009) (“Observations show that warming of the climate is unequivocal. The global warming 
observed over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping gases.”). 
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turn, drive a need to craft a convergent approach that optimizes the 
combination of vertical and horizontal approaches across regions of a 
federal system of government (like the United States) to more effectively 
address climate change. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, natural capital tragedies may result 
within each scale because of mismanagement of resources crucial to 
successful climate change policy at successive scales. Though individual 
entities within scales—whether private property owners or local, state, or 
national governments—may altruistically act irrationally and maximize the 
conservation and management of natural capital to mitigate climate 
change, there remain large gaps regarding the proper management of 
climate-crucial natural capital. This is evidenced by urban sprawl and lax 
land-use regulation, insufficient forest management standards leading to 
potentially grave threats to forests, continued wetland loss, poor 
agricultural practices, and so on. These tragedies may occur because 
entities within the scale fail to horizontally coordinate, or because 
governments higher up the scale fail to coordinate the activities within the 
scale. 
As discussed above, the failure to horizontally coordinate or vertically 
regulate is a product of legal authority and political action scenarios that 
vary by scale. Each scale of governance has a unique set of legal 
authority/political action permutations to which the actors are bound. 
Ultimately, it is these scenarios that shape the degree to which the 
management or mismanagement of natural capital within that scale is 
likely to result in commons tragedies. It is therefore useful to look to 
models of vertical regulatory coordination or horizontal self-coordination 
that have been used to successfully manage natural capital within each 
scale. These models may apply to different categories of natural capital 
that are less relevant to climate change mitigation, but their approaches 
may be transferable. These models may also be very familiar in approach 
or implementation, as, for example, a national policy aimed at clean water 
(the Clean Water Act) might provide a model for federal inputs into forest 
regulation. Alternatively, they may be quite unfamiliar and novel, as might 
be the case with one local government out of approximately 88,000 in the 
United States that has designed a unique and successful policy aimed at 
protecting natural capital. To this end, one Subpart below will detail 
vertical regulatory coordination for each scale, whereby the next scale up 
coordinates the activities of entities within the scale through a top-down 
approach to managing natural capital climate commons resources. 
Another Subpart will detail what horizontal self-coordination for 
managing natural capital climate commons resources would look like 
within each scale, whereby private-property owners or similarly situated 
governments work with each other to manage resources in the absence of, 
or supplemental to, vertical regulatory coordination. 
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A. Vertical Regulatory Coordination 
Vertical regulatory coordination for climate change at the global scale 
would seek to accomplish many of the same objectives that have been 
discussed in the international community but which have yet to be 
implemented via a treaty-based climate change response. The Kyoto 
Protocol provides an example of an international framework that seeks to 
achieve legally binding emissions limits on individual countries agreed 
upon at the international level.103 This approach has yet to succeed in 
gaining the support of the most significant global emitters of carbon, and 
indeed some scholars have noted that in the absence of global consensus 
the process has broken down into a variety of transnational, regional 
approaches to addressing climate change.104 Nonetheless, given both the 
ever-shifting climate and ever-shifting political attitudes, such a treaty 
could emerge in the future. While the Kyoto Protocol focuses primarily on 
emissions limits—the source component of carbon—a treaty might also 
focus on the preservation of natural capital crucial as a carbon sink, like 
forests, wetlands, and agricultural resources. Each of these, as described 
above, are the resources most affected by the overlay of the governance 
commons in the U.S. federal system given the current division of 
federal/subnational regulatory authority over their management. Of 
course, a combined approach regulating both carbon emissions and sinks 
might be a viable option as well, whereby vertical emissions limits result in 
carbon offset markets that drive the preservation of forests, wetlands, and 
agricultural lands. No matter the target of vertical regulation—and though 
the examples of successful vertical regulatory coordination are rare at the 
global level—success stories exist and provide one mechanism for 
addressing global commons concerns notwithstanding the current 
pessimism regarding treaty viability. 
The Montreal Protocol is instructive on this point. The Protocol is 
one of the most successful international agreements, having been ratified 
by nearly 200 countries,105 and it “provides a useful model for other long-
 
 103. Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 Va. L. Rev. 63, 71 n.30 (2013) (“The Kyoto 
Protocol is the world's only legally binding agreement on climate change.” (citing United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Q&A with UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christina 
Figures: The UNFCCC and the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban (2011)); José Antonio 
Urrutia, The Equator Principles or How the Way to Do Business Has Changed, 54 Rocky Mountain 
Min. L. Inst. 16-1 (2008) (“The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 
37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.”). 
 104. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30 Envt. & 
Plan. C: Gov’t & Pol’y 571 (2012); Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and 
Future U.N. Climate Change Regime (Mar. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773865. 
 105. Status of Ratification, United Nations Environment Programme (Jan. 2, 2013), http://ozone. 
unep.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php. 
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term environmental challenges such as climate change.”106 In fact, in “no 
other treaty have so many disparate actors in international society 
successfully cooperated and compromised to address a global 
environmental threat.”107 The Montreal Protocol took a prescriptive 
approach to the ozone problem, freezing both production and 
consumption levels of ozone-depleting CFCs and other chemicals as well 
as implementing a reduction schedule for their use. Importantly, these 
standards were set and agreed upon at the international level and 
subsequently agreed to by a vast majority of nations, rather than being 
merely targets or commitments developed domestically. The Protocol 
further prescribed strict trade measures on products containing or 
produced by the use of CFCs to encourage treaty signage and 
ratification.108  
In addition to prescriptions, the Protocol further provided technical 
and financial assistance to aid developing countries that might be limited 
in achieving reductions.109 Finally, the Protocol adopted a flexible 
approach allowing evolution over time, with parties assessing and 
reviewing controls at least every four years so that if “any of the controlled 
substances were found to be less harmful than thought or the schedules 
proved too stringent, the Protocol’s reduction schedules could be modified 
with a two-thirds majority of countries representing two-thirds of global 
consumption.”110 The Protocol has been effective in keeping ozone 
depletion on the international environmental agenda, and the parties 
have “met regularly since 1987, typically to tighten reduction schedules, 
bring new chemical substances under control, and establish many rules 
and operating procedures to implement what has become a 
comprehensive regime for managing a growing number of chemicals.”111 
Though there are current and future challenges to be faced by the 
Montreal Protocol regime,112 it has been regarded as a “triumph of 
international diplomacy,” reducing CFC and other ozone depleting use 
and production in the developed world more than 95% and with 
developing countries also making strides.113 
There are, of course, important distinctions between the problems 
addressed by the Montreal Protocol and those brought about by climate 
change, presenting additional challenges to adopting a global vertical 
regulatory approach both with regard to emissions limitations and 
 
 106. David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 533 (4th ed. 2010). 
 107. Id. at 595. 
 108. Id. at 584. 
 109. Id. at 585. 
 110. Id. at 554. 
 111. Id. at 555. 
 112. Id. at 566–68. 
 113. Id. at 595. 
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preservation of natural capital carbon sinks. Regarding emissions 
limitations, CFCs were used in fewer products and processes globally 
(relative to carbon), and as a result fewer sectors of the economy were 
implicated. Additionally, alternatives to CFCs became available relatively 
quickly, whereas there are very few readily available technologies for 
carbon as an energy source, at least on a scale that could rival the 
expansive use of carbon globally.  
Regarding the preservation of natural capital such as forests, 
wetlands, and agricultural resources as carbon sinks, the first challenging 
distinction is the connection of these resources to land-use policies. Each 
of these resources is implicated by a variety of land-use and other 
resource extraction policies related to the development, cultivation, or 
other use of land, whereas CFCs are industrial products manufactured or 
used in manufacturing processes and entering the stream of commerce. 
Tracking CFC emissions levels from a relatively uniform and limited set 
of industrial players within a global economic market might seem like an 
easy task when faced with the proposition of tracking GHG-emitting or 
GHG-sequestering land-use activities undertaken across a spectrum from 
individuals all the way up to corporations and governments—each 
engaged in a myriad of different economic endeavors on every square 
inch of surface area within a country. Virtually everywhere and everyone 
within a jurisdiction are implicated within any single land-use policy. 
Achieving adjustments of land use policies would also prove more 
difficult than emissions limitations because the division among levels of 
government vertically and across jurisdictions horizontally would require 
a far greater degree of coordination than a centralized authority setting 
standards across the country for an industry emitting or producing a 
handful of readily identifiable gases. 
Yet, despite these challenges, countries may one day agree to take 
action on both carbon emissions limitations and natural capital 
preservation. Indeed, for a time the Montreal Protocol seemed doomed to 
fail, until the political and scientific winds shifted enough to make the 
threat of ozone depletion to global populations very real.114 As a result, it 
seems premature to match the doom and gloom tone of climate change 
dialogue with a similar tone regarding the probability or efficacy of vertical 
global action to address it. For GHG emissions limitations, nations may 
agree to be bound to legal requirements that they achieve certain 
reductions in emissions over set periods of time, with economic and other 
penalties doled out at the international level in the event of 
noncompliance. Yet emissions reductions generally do not present the 
nested commons problems presented by the preservation of certain 
carbon-critical natural capital as GHG sinks. Emissions reductions tend to 
 
 114. See generally Hunter, supra note 106, ch. 10. 
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focus on regulation of industrial players involved in the national and global 
stream of commerce, which is far less impacted by the fragmented 
jurisdictions present in a federal system of government, at least in the 
United States.  
A global, legally binding treaty requiring the preservation of forests, 
wetlands, or agricultural resources, on the other hand, would be just the 
type of vertical regulatory arrangement complicated by the nested 
governance commons. Yet preservation of these types of natural capital 
could also be the most effective and efficient mechanism for combating 
climate change. Restrictions on industrial emissions, transportation 
emissions, or emissions from other sectors are often seen as potentially 
costly climate mitigation methods, due to technological and economic 
constraints of changing methods of production or energy portfolios over 
short time scales. On the other hand, the preservation of existing forest, 
wetlands, or agricultural resources requires little upfront cost, other than 
the potential cost of foregone development (which would likely be carbon 
intensive at any rate). And restoration of certain natural capital, like 
forests, is relatively low cost also, requiring far less significant human and 
financial capital expenditures to achieve than pure industrial emissions 
reductions. 
A global forest protocol, long the subject of discussion at the 
international level,115 could require certain stand density standards for 
participant countries’ forests, as well as riparian buffer zone, clear-
cutting, road-building, afforestation and reforestation, and a variety of 
other forest practice requirements that have impacts on GHG sources 
and sinks from forestry.116 As the Montreal Protocol proceeded regarding 
financial and technological assistance, a forest protocol could also 
facilitate investment mechanisms like those already on the table at the 
international level, such as Reduced Emissions from Forest Degradation 
and Destruction (“REDD”) programs, or what has become known as 
“REDD-plus.” REDD-plus seeks to curb forest destruction and 
degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks, but also promotes 
“conservation [and] sustainable management of forests . . . in developing 
countries”117 through programs aimed at alleviating rural poverty, 
conserving biodiversity, and sustaining forest ecosystem services.118 These 
programs could promote afforestation or forest preservation within 
individual nations in need of such projects and where the institutional or 
 
 115. See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 
82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 363, 372–78 (2011). 
 116. Constance L. McDermott et al., Global Environmental Forest Policies: An International 
Comparison 15–18 (2010). 
 117. Found. for Int’l Envtl. L. & Dev., Guide for REDD-Plus Negotiators 4 (2011). 
 118. Charlie Parker et al., The Little REDD+ Book 14 (3d ed. 2009). 
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political capacity does not exist to effectively carry out the prescriptive 
dictates of an international regime absent such assistance. 
Similarly, a wetland protocol might provide prescriptions on the 
filling or destruction of wetlands deemed of critical importance within 
nations, and might also set up international investment mechanisms for 
wetland restoration. These prescriptions could serve the purpose of both 
providing a sink for carbon as well as preserving or restoring wetlands as 
natural capital crucial to curb coastal land loss and threats to human 
settlements caused by increased hurricane and flood events.119 An 
international agricultural protocol might set limits on crop cultivation, such 
as soil tillage (carbon) and fertilizer use (nitrous oxide), or livestock 
manure management or diet (methane).120 It might also set up investment 
mechanisms to establish biofuel or methane energy generation 
technologies in areas where adoption of such technologies would be cost 
prohibitive. The use of forests and agricultural resources for energy in 
lieu of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide, but “this CO2 is of recent 
atmospheric origin (via photosynthetic carbon uptake) and displaces CO2 
which otherwise would have come from fossil carbon.”121 In other words, 
even though these fuels might be cultivated from agricultural or forest 
carbon sinks, “the primary GHG benefits of these options can generally 
be treated as equivalent to permanent emission reductions.”122 
Even if a stand-alone forest, wetland, or forest protocol is never 
developed, potentially significant mechanisms for encouraging wetland, 
forestland, and agricultural resource conservation and preservation are 
offset programs that are coupled with or subsumed under another 
prescriptive vertical regulatory program, such as a regulatory cap-and-
trade or carbon taxation system. Indeed, most iterations of proposed 
domestic carbon cap and trade legislation in the United States have 
provided for carbon offset projects driven by investment in, or credit 
purchases from, approved carbon sequestration projects—particularly 
those related to forests.123 In addition, the United States has considered 
agricultural offset programs to encourage conservation tillage, reduction 
of nitrogen fertilizer, changing manure management practices, and 
converting agricultural lands to forests or grasslands.124 These programs 
 
 119. See Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation-Adaptation Dilemma: Between 
Scylla and Charybdis, 73 La. L. Rev. 31, 61 (2012). 
 120. See Hudson, supra note 47. 
 121. Smith et al., supra note 44, at 499. 
 122. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in U.S. Forestry and 
Agriculture 2–9 (2005). 
 123. See Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); see also American 
Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); Dingell-Boucher 
Cap-and-Trade Bill, Inst. for Energy Research (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch. 
org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-trade-bill. 
 124. See John Horowitz & Jessica Gottlieb, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Econ. 
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have heightened appeal over stand-alone arrangements for either 
emissions reductions or natural capital preservation because policies aimed 
at reducing emissions alone from the forest, agricultural, or development 
sectors (in the case of wetlands) may not be as attractive as those that both 
reduce emissions and increase productivity of operations.125 Increasing 
productivity may occur through expansion or adjustment of agricultural 
or forestry operations in a way that causes more carbon to be 
sequestered, or by simply offsetting or perhaps even increasing profits 
displaced by emissions reduction expenses. It is true that offset projects 
have raised concern in some sectors regarding leakage, permanence, 
additionality, and other issues. Still, others have called for incorporating 
farming and land use offset investments into cap-and-trade programs.126 
A treaty might also require an adjustment in domestic subsidy 
programs related to natural capital cultivation and preservation. For 
example, the United States is one of the largest subsidizers of agriculture 
in the world, paying billions each year, with many subsidies supporting 
GHG-intensive commodity crop production.127 These subsidies largely 
“exacerbate chemical use, the expansion of cropland to sensitive areas, and 
overexploitation of water and other resources, while distorting trade and 
reinforcing unsustainable agricultural practices.”128 Yet, an international 
arrangement might follow the lead of the European Union, which in 2003 
began requiring that certain environmental requirements must be met 
before agricultural interests could receive subsidies.129 Similarly, perhaps 
an international regime could require that domestic subsidies within 
participant countries not be granted unless certain natural capital 
preservation and carbon sink activities were taken within forests, for 
wetlands, or on agricultural lands. 
Ultimately, vertical regulatory coordination at the global level, 
whether for emissions reductions, natural capital preservation, the 
inclusion of offset programs for natural capital within a prescriptive 
emissions reduction regime, subsidy restrictions, or otherwise, may require 
nations to give up a degree of sovereignty over each of these subject areas 
if legal requirements or targets for carbon emissions, or forest, wetland, 
and agricultural resource preservation are to be met. Even so, we have 
 
Brief No. 15, The Role of Agriculture in Reducing Greenhouse Gases 1 (2010). 
 125. See Smith, supra note 44, at 515. 
 126. Sara J. Scherr & Sajal Sthapit, Worldwatch Inst., Mitigating Climate Change Through 
Food and Land Use 6 (2009). For a review of the offset potential of agriculture, see Roger Claassen 
& Mitch Morehart, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 14, Agriculture 
Land Tenure and Carbon Offsets (2009). 
 127. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy 
in a Changing Global Environment, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 593, 597 (2010). 
 128. Scherr & Sthapit, supra note 126, at 32. 
 129. See Daniel Bianchi, Cross Compliance: The New Frontier in Granting Subsidies to the 
Agricultural Sector in the European Union, 19 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 817, 820 (2007). 
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succeeded before in crafting just such a regime, and though the challenges 
are more varied, complex, and numerous, when the metaphorical hole in 
the ozone becomes large enough for the international community in the 
context of climate change, we may be able to coordinate and take action 
far more effectively than seems possible now. 
In a way, shifting from the global to the national scale provides little 
room to expound on vertical regulatory approaches, since most of the 
approaches described above as part of a binding global treaty would be 
implemented by national regulations. In addition, in the United States, 
federal legislation on capping or taxing carbon emissions has yet to be 
enacted, and there is currently very little in the way of federal regulation of 
natural capital like forests, wetlands, or agricultural resources, aside from 
activities that occur on federally owned lands, of course. For example, 
federally owned forests make up more than one-third of U.S. forests.130 
Thus, national parks, wilderness areas131 and forests subject to the roadless 
rule132 may be considered de facto natural capital preservation areas. 
Policies on these lands could certainly change at any time, but currently 
they protect a significant quantity of resources crucial to combating 
climate change. 
Despite the current lack of vertical regulatory approaches at the 
national level, the United States could pass a federal statute pursuant to 
Commerce Clause authority setting emissions limitations or standards for 
natural capital preservation. In the forest context, the federal government 
could enact statutes setting stand density, riparian buffer zone, clear-
cutting, road-building, afforestation, or reforestation requirements for 
private forest owners. This would remedy the wide degree of regulatory 
inconsistency across states managing important forest resources. While the 
Commerce Clause case is strong for regulating private property owners 
engaged in the forest products market, the question becomes trickier in the 
context of preserving forests as carbon sinks—that is, preventing forests 
from being cleared, not by foresters, but by entities seeking to use the land 
for commercial or residential development. This might be achieved by the 
establishment of urban growth boundaries at the national level, setting a 
maximum standard of development density around cities of a certain size 
to forestall urban sprawl. Furthermore, any of the objectives described 
above could be a corollary of a national emissions cap-and-trade or 
carbon tax scheme that allows for forest offsets, as discussed above (or 
wetland or agricultural operation offsets). 
 
 130. See Forestry, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/forestry.html (last 
updated June 27, 2012).  
 131. Bryan Finegan, Forest Succession, 321 Nature 109 (1984). 
 132. Roadless Area Conservation, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. Forest Serv., http://www.fs.usda.gov/ 
help/roadless (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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The federal government might pass a similar statute aimed 
specifically at the preservation of wetlands as a carbon sink. Indeed, the 
federal government already maintains what might be considered a federal 
natural capital preservation statute aimed at private lands in the form of its 
§ 404 wetland fill permitting program.133 Though the Clean Water Act’s 
prohibition on the dredging and filling of wetlands facilitates potential 
federal government conservation or preservation of carbon-loaded 
wetlands, a vast majority of wetland fill permits are currently approved 
despite the potential of wetlands to sequester substantial quantities of 
carbon.134 The Clean Water Act does not explicitly contemplate impacts on 
climate prior to approving a fill permit. Rather, the Clean Water Act 
focuses primarily on water quality impacts, allowing wetlands to be filled 
when there is no practicable alternative less damaging to aquatic resources 
and when national waters would not be significantly degraded.135 
Nonetheless, the program does require wetland offsets that could be 
significant carbon sinks—if the program were to be utilized more 
aggressively.136 Additional tweaks in the § 404 program may allow it to play 
a more substantial role in preserving wetlands. The § 404 program 
presently exempts “normal agricultural operations.”137 Some scholars have 
argued that removal of this exemption “could protect many jurisdictional 
wetlands that are currently allowed to be plowed with impunity,” and that 
“without the exemption for those wetlands that are impacted, mitigation 
would be required to offset the functions impacted by the agricultural 
activities, as is required for other types of activities that impact 
jurisdictional wetlands.”138 
In addition to forests and wetlands, the federal government’s primary 
involvement in agricultural policy is through the provision of subsidies for 
agricultural operations. There is little reason, besides politics, that the 
 
 133. See Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises from the 
Hidden Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v. 
United States, 68 La. L. Rev. 983, 1011 (2008). The CWA is one of two such federal statutes, since the 
Endangered Species Act and its focus on species and critical habitat might also be characterized as a 
federal natural capital preservation statute, even on private lands.  
 134. The Corps receives approximately 80,000 permit requests annually, and only about 9% are 
required to go through a “detailed evaluation for an individual permit.” Id. at 1011. Most are approved 
through a nationwide or region-specific permit. Id. at 1011–12. Of the 9% required to file for an 
individual permit, less than 0.3% are denied. Id. at 1012. The EPA only exercised its veto authority 
over Corps wetland permitting eleven times between 1972 and 2007. Id.; see Craig Pittman & 
Matthew Waite, Paving Paradise: Florida’s Vanishing Wetlands and the Failure of No Net 
Loss 167 (2009). 
 135. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA843-F-04-001, Wetlands Regulatory Authority, available 
at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013). 
 136. Leonard Shabman & Paul Scodari, The Future of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 Choices 
Mag. 65, 65 (2005). See generally Pittman & Waite, supra note 134. 
 137. Clean Water Act § 404(f)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387 (2012). 
 138. Angelo, supra note 127, at 642. 
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federal government could not use its subsidy program to effectively coerce 
changes in agricultural operations related to GHG emissions and sinks, 
such as soil tillage (carbon) and fertilizer use (nitrous oxide), or livestock 
manure management or diet (methane), much as has the European Union. 
Shifting to the state scale, we might also see state regulations take the 
many forms described above related to both emissions caps or natural 
capital preservation. While a cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions 
has not materialized at the federal level, the state of California has recently 
created such a program, and one that provides a model for other states 
seeking to both cap carbon emissions as well as establish markets for 
natural capital preservation. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,139 
also known as “AB 32,” has a goal of capping and reducing GHG 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020 and achieving an 80% reduction 
from 1990 levels by 2050.140 AB 32 also provides a GHG offset program for 
certain types of agricultural (livestock-related) and forestry (including 
urban forestry) projects.141 Entities may use offset credits to meet up to 8% 
of their triennial compliance obligation under the program.142 
Rather than tying natural capital preservation to voluntary offset 
markets embedded in emissions reduction regulations, state governments 
may use their land use regulatory authority to zone for the conservation 
or preservation of agricultural lands, wetlands, or forestlands. An 
example would be the Maryland Forest Conservation Act, which requires 
all counties in Maryland with less than 200,000 acres of forest cover to 
adopt ordinances to conserve forests.143 The Forest Practices Act in 
Washington144 is one of the most stringent forest management regulations 
in the country. In addition to setting strict standards regarding riparian 
buffer zone, reforestation, and other forest management standards, the act 
also serves a preservation function.145 If a landowner plans to convert 
forests without an approved forest practices application declaring that 
the forest will be converted, the Washington Department of Natural 
Resources will issue a “notice of conversion” to the local government 
where the property is located.146 The local government then is required to 
deny a building or subdivision permit application for the property for six 
 
 139. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, §§ 1–2 (West 2006). 
 140. Cap-and-Trade Program, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last reviewed Apr. 10, 2013). 
 141.  Compliance Offset Program, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last reviewed Mar. 1, 2013). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Forest Conservation Ordinance, Wash. Cnty., Md., Dep’t of Planning & Zoning, 
http://www.washco-md.net/planning/forest.shtm (last modified May 30, 2012). 
 144. Wash. Code § 76.09 (2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=76.09. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
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years from the time of the notice of conversion.147 This provides a strong 
incentive for private property owners to curb their rationality and gain 
approval of a higher-level authority before appropriating forest resources. 
Contrast this approach to that regarding forests in the southeastern United 
States, where most states maintain forest management “best practices” 
that are entirely voluntary, where there is no regulatory oversight of forest 
operations, much less a comprehensive state regulation to ensure the 
conservation or preservation of forest resources. 
Michigan has its own wetland regulatory program, whereby property 
owners must receive a state permit to fill, use, drain, or develop wetlands 
over a certain acreage and connected to the Great Lakes or inland ponds, 
lakes, rivers, and streams.148 Even “isolated wetlands” not covered by the 
federal § 404 program or connected to any of these waterways or larger 
than a certain acreage may be covered under the regulatory program if the 
“DEQ has determined that these wetlands are essential to the preservation 
of the state’s natural resources and has notified the property owner.”149 It is 
this latter focus on isolated wetlands that may not be reached by the § 404 
program that make these types of vertical regulatory approaches on the 
state scale arguably more effective at wetlands preservation than the § 404 
program. Indeed, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
Florida, Minnesota, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Oregon all maintain 
isolated wetland protections.150 In an example of bridging state and local 
scales, most of these regulations are “cooperative state/local regulatory 
efforts where much of the actual regulation is achieved in cooperation with 
local governments.”151 
State governments may also develop urban growth boundaries to 
protect agricultural, wetlands, and/or forestlands. Oregon is instructive 
on this point, maintaining a comprehensive growth boundary plan,152 and 
protecting rural lands outside the boundary including non-urban 
agricultural and forested lands.153 
 
 147. See Forest Practices Act, Mun. Research & Servs. Ctr. of Wash., http://www.mrsc.org/ 
subjects/environment/forest/forest.aspx (last updated Sept. 2010) (providing detailed information on 
the Washington Forest Practices Act). 
 148. Geomare-Anderson Wetlands Protection Act, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
Act pt. 303, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451, available at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-451-1994-iii-1-
inland-waters-303. 
 149. See State and Federal Wetlands Regulation, Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3687-10801--,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 150. See generally Jon Kusler, Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, Inc., The SWANCC 
Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands (2004). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Or. Dep’t. of Land Conservation & Dev., OAR 660-015-0000(14), Oregon’s Statewide 
Planning Goals & Guidelines (2006). 
 153. Rural Development in Oregon, Or. Dep’t. of Land Conservation & Dev., http://www.oregon. 
gov/LCD/pages/ruraldev.aspx#Rural_Development_in_Oregon (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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Finally, shifting to the local scale demonstrates how intertwined 
state governments are with the local governments that they empower to 
either implement state regulatory plans or pass their own regulatory 
programs. Providing yet another demonstration of the nested, scale-
bridging nature of federal governance and resource commons, the 
Maryland statute described above, requiring local governments to 
develop forest preservation plans, results in a variety of regulatory 
approaches by local governments. One example is Washington County 
Maryland’s Forest Conservation Ordinance,154 which requires that 
development of land that is projected to remove at least 40,000 square 
feet of forest must submit a mitigation plan to the county planning 
commission. Mitigation options available to private or government 
property owners include on-site retention or planting, off-site retention 
or planting, natural regeneration, and payment-in-lieu of planting or 
retention. The funds generated by the payment-in-lieu of planting option 
are used to facilitate conservation easement purchases and forest 
planting operations in sensitive environmental areas, thus providing “the 
opportunity to plant and then protect, by easement, large contiguous 
areas of forest rather than promote small-scattered forested areas in 
order to enhance optimum benefit to the environment.”155 
Washington also has a number of local governments engaged in the 
preservation of natural capital within local jurisdictions. The city of 
Bellingham, for example, maintains a municipal code regulating the 
clearing of any removal of vegetation, including trees, on any lot or 
property within the city.156 Similarly, Monroe issues land-clearing permits 
for the conversion of all forests within the municipality.157 Issaquah actually 
places a six-year moratorium on the conversion of forests currently 
managed under a forests practices permit to other development.158 
Regarding wetlands, between four and six thousand local 
governments have adopted local wetland regulations in order to conserve 
wetlands via the zoning process.159 These regulations focus on the 
preservation of wetlands, offsetting wetlands that are filled for 
development, or the usage of wetlands for flood control.160 
Not only might local governments engage in preservation of natural 
capital like forests or wetlands—or the aforementioned zoning to preserve 
agricultural open space free from development—but governments might 
 
 154. Wash. Cnty., Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance, supra note 100. 
 155. Forest Conservation Ordinance, supra note 143. 
 156. Bellingham, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 16.60.50 (1992).  
 157. Monroe, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 20.08 (2012). 
 158. Issaquah, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 16.26.185 (2012). 
 159. See Jon Kusler, Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Common Questions: Local 
Government Wetland Protection Programs 2 (2006). 
 160. Id. 
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also engage in vertical regulation of emissions. San Francisco officials 
recently adopted a rule to control emissions from one particular cement 
plant in Cupertino.161 While not focused on carbon, but rather nitrogen 
oxides, particulate matter, and mercury, these limits are more stringent 
than the suggested federal standards. The impetus for the regulation was 
citizen concern over health impacts and, although many GHGs are not as 
obvious of a health concern and local governments have a race-to-the-
bottom incentive to refuse carbon emissions regulations in their local 
jurisdiction, there is no reason that local governments could not begin to 
regulate carbon emissions much the same way many vertically regulate 
carbon sinks like forests or wetlands. 
B. Horizontal Self-Coordination 
Horizontal self-coordination among federal, state, or local 
governments or private sector parties explores “how a group of principals 
who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern 
themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to 
free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically.”162 It is an attempt by 
similarly situated actors to coordinate their appropriation of a commons 
resource to avoid a tragedy of the commons. The horizontal self-
coordinated approach differs from the vertical regulatory approach set 
forth above in that at each scale a higher scale entity does not set standards 
of appropriation, monitor appropriation, or sanction misappropriation. 
Rather, the actors are actively involved in managing the resource. They 
coordinate their efforts as independent bodies and cooperatively develop 
objectives relevant to appropriation with other similarly situated actors. 
They then achieve those objectives through collective regulation, 
oversight, and sanctions. Critical attributes of successful common pool 
resource management through horizontal collaboration have been detailed 
in the factual and theoretical literature.163 Those attributes include 
 
 161. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Reg. 9, Rule 13 (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://www. 
baaqmd.gov/~/media/Files/Planning%20and%20Research/Rules%20and%20Regs/reg%2009/RG0913.ashx. 
 162. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 29. 
 163. See id. at 90–91. Ostrom identifies crucial attributes of successful collaborations, stating that 
each attribute is “an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these 
institutions in sustaining the [common pool resource] . . . and gaining the compliance of generation 
after generation of appropriators to the rules in use.” Id. at 90; see also Thomas Dietz et al., The 
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Science 1907 (2003). A 2010 study of ninety-one empirical 
studies applying the attributes identified by Ostrom found: 
[T]he principles are well supported. The most trenchant critiques were abstract, rather than 
empirical. This does not mean that the principles are complete; their incompleteness is the 
most important empirical critique we found in the literature. Other factors such as the size 
of user groups, differing types of heterogeneity within or between user groups, and the type 
of government regime within which users operate are clearly important in many cases. 
Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource 
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management approaches that define clear boundaries and users, adopt 
rules concerning appropriation that are based on local conditions, 
incorporate flexibility to modify rules, monitor usage, impose graduated 
sanctions, provide conflict-resolution mechanisms, insulate from higher 
scale interference, and organize in multiple levels of nested enterprises.164 
In the context of climate change, horizontal coordination on the 
global scale is an attempt to cooperatively organize, manage, and control 
global GHG emissions through collaboration among national 
governments. Building off of Ostrom’s collaborative model, a horizontal 
self-coordinated approach to address GHG emissions would consist of 
individual nations agreeing on target levels of GHG emissions, enacting 
domestic standards based on local conditions for achieving those emissions 
levels, flexibly adjusting rules for GHG emissions over time as needed, 
establishing metrics to measure GHG emissions, monitoring GHG 
emissions both domestically and cooperating with other nations to allow 
necessary measures of horizontal oversight, establishing horizontally levied 
sanctions for exceeding target usage, and adjudicating disputes concerning 
usage through collaborative engagement with other nations.165 
Alternatively, individual nations could sustain the global commons 
atmosphere and avoid a climate tragedy of the commons by horizontally 
collaborating on preserving and developing GHG sinks. Collective action 
on protecting, conserving, and growing forests and wetlands or in adjusting 
agricultural production methods could result in individual nations working 
together to achieve the overall targeted results in a non-competitive, non-
tragic manner. 
While collective action on GHG emissions and sinks exists among 
some of the relevant actor nations on the global scale, there is no 
horizontal collaboration that incorporates all, or most, nations. 
Nonetheless, existing horizontal efforts are instructive on how more robust 
forms of horizontal coordination might be achieved on the global scale. 
For example, in the wake of failed negotiations on legally binding global 
agreements pertaining to GHG emissions, such as a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol, some nations have attempted to horizontally coordinate their 
efforts to limit GHG emissions. The framework for Europe 2020: A 
European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth provides 
such an example.166  
 
Management, Ecology & Soc’y, Dec. 2010, at 38. 
 164. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 91–102. 
 165. See id. at 92–95, 100–01. 
 166. Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010). Similar examples can be found relative to 
GHG sinks. See, e.g., Council Recommendation (EC) No. 413/2002of May 30, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 148) 
24 (recommending that individual nations partner with regional and local authorities (public and 
private) to determine who has the authority to control coastal zones with the goal that nations will be 
better able to coordinate their efforts when they know who has authority to act). 
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Pursuant to the framework, the European Council agreed to a broad 
reform strategy that included a plan to combat climate change. In 
particular, the Council committed E.U. members to reducing their 
collective emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels.167 While at the 
outset this would appear to represent individual actors ceding authority to 
a higher body to vertically regulate, importantly, the individual E.U. 
member nations did not relinquish sovereignty to the Council or the E.U. 
Commission. Rather, the individual members are responsible for 
identifying their respective national targets, planning a strategy to achieve 
those targets, and monitoring or enforcing the individual nations’ targets. 
The Council framework establishes an overall goal, but each individual 
nation designs its own carbon dioxide emission reduction strategy.168 The 
Council does not mandate the target, nor does it devise the strategy for 
achieving the target. While each nation is responsible for creating a plan to 
meet its target, those efforts are supported by other E.U. nations through 
the collaborative process of sharing information and resources. 
By April 2011, each nation had established its own target and a 
process for achieving that target. The targets ranged from a 20% increase 
to a 20% decrease from 1990 levels.169 The variation in the individual 
nation targets illustrates the flexibility embedded in the horizontal 
approach. By allowing each actor to develop its targets and strategy based 
on individualized local conditions, the collaborative approach does not 
attempt to force a single standard for multiple and diverse jurisdictions.170 
This coordinated effort among E.U. nations, however, does not provide 
for individual nations (or a higher authority) to monitor and sanction 
failure to achieve the targets. Thus, even this example does not fully 
incorporate the full scope of recommended elements to achieve a 
successful horizontal collaboration at the global scale. 
Horizontal self-coordination on the national scale parallels that taking 
place on the global scale. Instead of individual nations collaborating, 
horizontal self-coordination on the national scale involves collective action 
among state government actors to avoid the tragic depletion of natural 
resources. When state actors confront commons resources that are not 
managed by federal vertical regulation (either by a lack of legal authority 
(scenarios NT-2, T-2, T-4) or political action (scenarios NT-4, T-1, T-3)), 
states often compete with each other in a “race to the bottom,” resulting in 
 
 167. The Council also agreed to achieve 20% of EU energy consumption from renewable 
resources and a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels through energy 
efficiency. Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, supra note 166, at 11.  
 168. We recognize that many actions on the global scale incorporate a mixture or hybrid of 
horizontal and vertical actions. The Europe 2020 strategy is one such example. 
 169. Targets can be found at Europe 2020 Targets, Europe 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/ 
pdf/targets_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).  
 170. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 92. 
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the overconsumption of natural capital resources. The Apalachicola/ 
Chattahoochee/Flint river system (“ACF”) provides a good example of 
states on the national scale commons actively engaged in an unresolved 
competitive conflict over natural capital resources in the absence of federal 
vertical regulation. The ACF is composed of the Apalachicola, 
Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers. The Chattahoochee’s headwaters flow 
south from the mountains of northern Georgia toward Atlanta. Prior to 
reaching Atlanta, the Chattahoochee is delayed by the Buford Dam, 
forming Lake Lanier.171 From Atlanta the Chattahoochee flows southwest 
and traces the boundary between Georgia and Alabama. The Flint rises 
just south of Atlanta, meets with the Chattahoochee at the Georgia-
Florida border, and the two become the Apalachicola.172 About 75% of the 
ACF basin lies in Georgia, 12.5% in Florida, and 12.5% in Alabama.173 
The relevant state actors appropriating from the ACF resource on 
the national commons, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, have had a 
contentious relationship dating back to the 1970s.174 All of the state actors 
are motivated by self-interest that at times includes both overlapping and 
differing concerns.175 For a variety of reasons, the parties have been 
unable to negotiate a mutually agreed-upon resolution to properly 
manage the resource. They have spent enormous amounts of time and 
money inefficiently depleting the resource and litigating how much each 
actor can appropriate, how often, and for what purposes. As for federal 
vertical regulation, the Army Corps of Engineers attempted to address 
ACF water allocation issues several times between 1989 and 2009. At 
each attempt, one of the states or non-state government actors went to 
court and succeeded in preventing the Corps from doing so.176 
 
 171. The Chestatee River also feeds into Lake Lanier. 
 172. See Heather Ellit, Alabama’s Water Crisis, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 383, 395 (2012). 
 173. See Steve Leitman, Lessons Learned from Transboundary Management Efforts in the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin, USA, in Transboundary Water Resources: A Foundation 
for Regional Stability in Central Asia 197 (John E. Moerlins et al. eds., 2008). 
 174. Atlanta is also a relevant actor on the national commons with potentially conflicting interests 
and is in competition with the state actors in the ACF dispute. See id. at 198–99. (noting Atlanta’s 
interests in growing water demands and maintaining Lake Lanier for recreational purposes). We will 
explore this jumping of scales further in further research based on this Article. 
 175. For example, actors’ self-interest may vary from upstream desires to maximize water 
withdrawals for in-state users, maintain reservoir levels for periods of draught, and provide 
recreational uses, to downstream desires for commercial navigation, pollution control from upstream 
dumping, wildlife preservation, and economic development. See id. at 197–98. 
 176. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1183 (11th Cir. 2011). The 
Tarrant Water District represents another example of state actors failing to horizontally coordinate in 
the absence of vertical regulation on the national scale. In 2004, Oklahoma passed a law that barred 
out-of-state water sales pending the completion of a state-wide water study. Okla. Stat. tit. 82, 
§ 1B(A) (2004). Oklahoma’s actor had a large impact on the Fort Worth/Arlington area, which relied 
on the Oklahoma-based Red River for its water supply. The Tarrant Water District sought and was 
denied rights to purchase water from the Red River. In January 2012 it filed a petition with the 
Supreme Court claiming that the Commerce Clause precludes Oklahoma from barring interstate 
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Addressing commons dilemmas similar to the ACF conflict through 
horizontal self-coordination involves individual states collaborating to self-
regulate, monitor, sanction, and adjudicate usage of the commons 
resource. It does not involve ceding authority to the federal government or 
another higher-level entity (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority)177 to 
regulate resource appropriation and management. Rather, the individual 
states coordinate their management of the resource to avoid destroying the 
resource. In the context of climate change, a theoretical horizontal 
collaboration among states would consist of states collectively setting 
GHG emission standards, protecting and growing GHG sinks, monitoring 
and assessing emissions and sinks, and sanctioning lack of compliance. 
In the absence of vertical regulation, the Chesapeake Bay Program is 
an example of state actors horizontally coordinating on the national scale 
to, among other things, address natural capital commons relevant to 
climate change. The Chesapeake Bay Program is a regional partnership 
among state actors and other public and private entities.178 The state actors 
include the “Principle Partners,” Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, 
and the “Headwater State Partners,” Delaware, New York, and West 
Virginia.179 The six states work together to collaborate, share information, 
and set goals.180 The states jointly address issues, such as climate adaptation 
and mitigation, relevant to sea level rises181 and forest restoration.182 In 
December 2007, the state partners committed to conserve and restore 
forests in the Bay watershed by, among other things, permanently 
protecting an additional 695,000 acres of forest by 2020 and establishing 
and implementing mechanisms to track and assess forest land cover 
change at the county and township level every five years.183 The state 
partners have also engaged in a monitoring program, which is a Bay-wide 
cooperative effort to observe numerous physical, chemical, and biological 
characteristics twenty times a year in the mainstream and tributaries.184 
Monitoring important natural capital includes observing changes in the 
levels of nutrients and sediment, chemical contaminants, plankton, 
 
transfer of water. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
2013 WL 49810 (Jan. 4, 2013) (No. 11-889). 
 177. The Tennessee Valley Authority’s geographic area covers parts of seven states and addresses 
a number of natural capital related issues.  
 178. Partner Organizations, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/ 
partners (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 179.  Id. 
 180. How We Work, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/how (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 181. Climate Change, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/ 
climate_change (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 182. Forests, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/forests (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 183. See Partner Organizations, supra note 178. 
 184. Id. 
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benthos, finfish and shellfish, underwater bay grasses, water temperature, 
salinity, and dissolved oxygen.185 
As international and federal vertical regulatory actions stall, a 
number of states are horizontally collaborating on multi-jurisdictional 
GHG emission reduction plans.186 This past summer, governors of all six 
New England states agreed to coordinate efforts to make large-scale 
investments in cost-effective renewable energy resources.187 The effort 
will allow the states to leverage their collective purchasing power, and 
avoid the costly process of competing with each other in the way that the 
ACF state actors have. In lieu of a race to the bottom, the New England 
states’ behavior may more aptly be described as a relay race to the top. 
Similarly, the Western Climate Initiative has had a variety of climate 
change related successes through state (U.S. state and Canadian province) 
collaboration.188 What began as individual states and provinces formulating 
their respective emissions reduction plans, morphed into a multi-
jurisdictional effort to collaborate on reducing GHG emissions, develop an 
emission trading program, and monitor and track cross-border GHG 
emissions. As a horizontal collaboration, the Western Climate Initiative 
has no oversight or regulatory authority over the individual states and 
provinces. The individual actors remain the primary managers of 
appropriation. However, a system of appropriation and monitoring by 
the states was never formally adopted, and by 2011, the majority of the 
participating U.S. states had formally withdrawn. Importantly, California 
and the Canadian provinces continue to develop a regional cap-and-
trade market for voluntary and mandatory emission reductions. 
Similar to state actors on the national commons, local actors on the 
state commons have an opportunity to address mitigation and adaption 
measures relevant to climate change in the absence of vertical regulation. 
 
 185. Monitoring, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/programs/ 
monitoring (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 186. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White House Missed Their 
Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, New Yorker, Oct. 11, 2011 (detailing the failure of 
Congress to pass comprehensive legislation on climate change). 
 187. Kelsey Lafreniere, New England Governors Announce Clean Energy Resolution on Regional 
Procurement, New England Clean Energy Council (July 30, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://www. 
cleanenergycouncil.org/blog/2012/07/30/new-england-governors-announce-clean-energy-resolution-on-
regional-procurement. 
 188. Current WCI Partners are British Columbia, California, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. See 
WCI Provincial and State Partner Contacts, W. Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ 
wci-partners (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). Current WCI, Inc. participants are British Columbia, 
California, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba. See Program Design, W. Climate Initiative, 
http://www.wci-inc.org/program-design.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); see also Reg’l Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005) (establishing the framework for 
collaboration among northeast and mid-Atlantic states and creating the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative); Mission Statement, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2013) (listing the participating state actors as Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). 
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Even so, as the scale moves down from the national commons to the 
state commons, action by individual actors on multi-jurisdictional issues, 
such as climate change, becomes less economically efficient and more 
irrational.189 Not only must local actors overcome international, national, 
and state legal barriers that may prohibit cohesive (or, at times, any) 
local action on climate change, but also there are a combination of social, 
political, and economic obstacles that encourage local actors to tragically 
deplete resources. Nonetheless, in the face of international, federal, and, 
at times, state inaction, local governments—regardless of national and 
state affiliation—have horizontally coordinated to tap into expanded 
opportunities to tackle climate change. 
While many cities are individually reducing their own GHG emissions 
and adopting protective ordinances for GHG sinks (and thus acting 
irrationally),190 others are attempting to tackle the challenges together 
through horizontal collaboration. The following two examples illustrate 
the potential to have far-reaching geographical agreements among local 
governments that collectively impact millions of individuals and large 
economies. Further, the examples exemplify the kind of local preferences 
that can drive climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, 
regardless of federal or state action or local government location. They 
are an attempt to leverage the collective will and resources of local 
governments to avoid a tragedy in the absence of vertical regulation. 
The C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group is a horizontal self-
coordinated effort comprised of local governments across the globe 
seeking to address climate change.191 In 2005, representatives from 
eighteen megacities agreed to cooperate on “reducing climate emissions by 
taking decisive and immediate action”192 Over the next several years, the 
cooperative expanded to include fifty-eight megacities, representing 18% 
of the global GDP, approximately 8% of the world’s population, and over 
4700 climate-mitigation or climate-adaption actions.193 C40 continues to 
develop collaborative efforts among municipalities, and it now 
collaborates with the Clinton Climate Initiative, World Bank, and 
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability—to facilitate financing and 
to track, monitor, and report on GHG emissions.194 Most relevant to 
collective action, the C40 city members collaborate on best practices and 
 
 189. See Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, supra note 58, at 1022; Rosenbloom, 
supra note 4, at 446–62. 
 190. See Carbon Disclosure Project, Measurement for Management: CDP Cities 2012 Global 
Report (2012) (setting forth individual local government initiatives to address climate change). 
 191. History of the C40, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, http://www.c40cities.org/history 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 192. Id. 
 193. C40 Cities, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, http://www.c40cities.org/c40cities (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 194. History of the C40, supra note 191. 
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the development of programs to leverage their collective knowledge, 
experience, wealth, purchase power, and other assets.  
In doing so, the members have initiated programs, such as C40-CCI 
Climate Positive Development Programme (supporting and collaborating 
on best practices relevant to large urban development projects) and the 
Carbon Finance Capacity Building Programme (sharing knowledge for 
various local climate and carbon financing ideas), that federal and state 
governments have been unable or unwilling to develop.195 Recently, C40 
staff have been working more directly with local government staff on 
establishing metrics and baselines relevant to climate change and 
implementing many of the best practices to support climate action in their 
respective cities.196 Because the C40 cities are located in numerous 
countries and subnational states and because they represent a significant 
portion of the world’s population and GDP, their combined efforts have 
the potential not only to alter climate-changing conditions, but also to 
motivate other levels of governments to take similar action. And, of 
course, if local efforts reach a critical mass, they can efficiently address 
global collective action problems in the absence of vertical regulation by 
higher levels of government. 
Similarly, the Union of the Baltic Cities (“UBC”) was founded in 
1991 by thirty-two member cities to foster sustainable development in the 
Baltic Sea Region.197 The UBC was created in the wake of social and 
environmental changes occurring in the region. Many of the natural 
resources bordering on or part of the Baltic Sea had been subjected to 
tragic overconsumption in a manner very much resembling the ACF 
dispute. In the absence of vertical regulation compelling the sustainable 
management of natural resources, 108 cities from ten countries in the 
Baltic Sea region entered into a collaborative relationship to do so.198 The 
goals of the UBC, as stated in the Statute of the Union of the Baltic Cities, 
are: 
to promote and strengthen cooperation and exchange of experience 
among the cities in the Baltic Sea Region, to advocate for common 
interests of the local authorities in the region, and to act on behalf of the 
cities and local authorities in common matters towards regional, 
national, European and international bodies, as well as achieving 
sustainable development in the Baltic Sea Region with full respect to 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. XI General Conference, Liepāja, 5–6 October 2011, Union of the Baltic Cities, 
http://www.ubc.net/documentation,56,1006.html (last modified Dec. 8, 2011); UBC Strategy 2010–2015, 
Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/documentation,55,195.html (last modified Jan. 29, 2010). 
 198. Those countries are Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland. Member Cities, Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/member_cities 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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European principles of local and regional self-governance and 
subsidiarity.199 
This definition not only recognizes the multi-jurisdictional challenges 
facing local governments (and the corresponding difficulties with 
addressing those challenges on the local level), but it also acknowledges 
the importance of preserving local sovereignty and the benefits that can be 
achieved through local government collaboration, as opposed to vertical 
regulation.200 This is reflected in UBC’s actions, which on the one hand 
attempt to address many climate commons challenges at the local level 
though programs like the UBC Agenda 21 Action Program and BUSTRIP-
Baltic Urban Sustainable Transport Implementation and Planning, and on 
the other hand actively advocate for local governance in Europe through 
programs like Challenge of eCitizen: Promoting eGovernment Actions in 
Cities and MUE-25: Sustainable Future for Cities.201 
In addition to federal, state, and local governments, private sector 
individuals may collectively manage their appropriations of natural capital 
resources to avoid a tragedy of the commons. In some ways, the challenges 
facing these actors in forming horizontal collaborations are the most 
complex, as they are potentially subject to three tiers of vertical regulation 
(international, federal, and state) and can quickly jump scales from local to 
state to national to global. 
Horizontal collaboration among these individuals has taken a 
variety of forms, many of which have been detailed in Ostrom’s work.202 
One increasingly common collaborative effort relevant to climate change 
and GHG sinks are private sector individuals’ attempts to collectively 
preserve forests. Individual landowners’ have collaborated to create 
trusts to halt the depletion of forests.203 The Pacific Forest Trust, for 
example, is a voluntary horizontal collaboration of landowners (including 
 
 199. UBC Statute, Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/documentation,55,194.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 200. The UBC members are engaged in a host of climate-change-related activities, including 
compiling a best practices database that represents their shared experiences. Through this database, 
member cities have the ability to learn from past failures and successes of the other member cities. In 
addition, the UBC’s Commission on the Environment has implemented the UBC Sustainable Action 
Programme, focusing on four sustainability processes: awareness and commitment, management of 
resources, management and leadership, and quality of life. Union of the Baltic Cities, UBC 
Sustainability Action Programme 2010–2015: Agenda for Sustainable Baltic Cities (2010). 
 201. See, e.g., Union of the Baltic Cities, Agenda 21 Action Programme 2004–2009, Roadmap for 
Sustainable Baltic Cities (2004); BUSTRIP Final Conference, UBC Commission on Environment, 
Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/news,50,396.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); The 
Challenge of Managing Urban Environments, MUE-25 (UBC Commission on Environment Secretariat, 
Turku, Finland) (Feb. 2006). 
 202. See Ostrom, supra note 13. 
 203. See, e.g., Working Forest Conservation Easements, Pacific Forest Trust, https://www. 
pacificforest.org/working-forest-conservation-easements.html (last visited Feb. 25. 2013) (“Working 
forest conservation easements provide private landowners the means to permanently conserve their 
forests for a variety of public benefits while keeping them in private ownership and productive forestry.”). 
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individuals and corporations) that works to obtain conservation 
easements on forestland.204 The individual members contribute property 
interests in the form of conservation easements and collectively manage 
the pool of easements for both economic and environmental gain.205 As 
the President and Co-Founder of PFT stated, the “overall impact of 
these [easements] is to make natural and environmentally beneficial 
management more competitive economically.”206  
This economic benefit is made possible through the leveraging of the 
individual actors’ efforts through the horizontal collaborative. The PFT 
promotes the growth of older and larger trees before harvest and the 
conservation of forests from development.207 PFT maintains a full-time 
staff responsible for monitoring easement performance, including visiting 
each easement at least once per year, reviewing project plans submitted by 
landowners, verifying timber harvest levels against established limits, and 
reviewing aerial imagery over time to identify changes not observed with 
site visits.208 If necessary, PFT enforces the terms of the easement against 
the individual actor misappropriating. In doing so, PFT meets with the 
actor to attempt to remedy the issue. If no resolution can be agreed 
upon, the easement specifies the process for enforcement.209 
The horizontal collaborative approach is designed to encourage 
individual actors on a given scale to proactively reduce GHG emissions 
and increase GHG sinks by providing an additional option to avoid the 
tragic consumption of natural resources vital to maintaining a stable 
climate. It attempts to incentivize action on climate change without 
devolving into a tragedy of the commons and without ceding sovereignty 
to a higher-level body for standard setting, monitoring, or sanctioning. 
Conclusion: A Need for Convergent Nested Commons 
Governance 
At its core, the purpose of this Article has been to provide a number 
of insights into federal governance structure as a complex, multiscalar 
commons within which natural capital commons resources are embedded. 
The primary contribution of this Article is to deconstruct the scales of a 
federal system of government in an attempt to isolate and identify 
 
 204. See Laurie A. Wayburn, Conservation Easements as Tools to Achieve Regulatory 
Environmental Goals, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 175, 181 (2011). 
 205. Id. “The easements provide financial incentives to landowners to hold their forests longer, 
leave more structure after harvest, and provide for a more-complex native forest. The economic 
value . . . is appraised, and this value is returned to landowners either directly in the purchase of the 
conservation easement, through tax benefits, or a combination thereof.” Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Email from Ivy Kostick, Stewardship Manager, Pacific Forest Trust, to John Remus, Drake 
Law School (July 23, 2012) (on file with authors). 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
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potential commons resource management complications in individual 
governance scales. This Article seeks to demonstrate how a natural capital 
commons exists within at least four individual governance scales—private 
property owners operating on the local governance commons, local 
governments operating on the state governance commons, state 
governments operating on the national governance commons, and national 
governments operating on the global governance commons. An analysis of 
each successive scale reveals that within each two-dimensional (horizontal 
and vertical) scale, a number of scenarios may arise with regard to the 
existence of horizontal actors’ or vertical governments’ legal authority to 
engage in resource management and their political action to sustainably do 
so. As represented in Figure 4, these two-dimensional scales are nested 
one within another and with multiple nations, states, and local 
governments vertically regulating or horizontally coordinating across 
scales—creating an even more complex structure that under a number of 
circumstances takes on the characteristics of a legally entrenched natural 
capital governance commons. This nesting of governance scales, and the 
interplay between the commons users and resources within and across 
scales, adds a feature to natural capital governance and commons analysis 
that is largely overlooked and little understood. 
Second, this Article has sought to analyze in an isolated manner the 
potential solutions within each scale—either horizontal coordination 
among actors appropriating resources on the same scale or vertical 
coordination of those actors by the government situated at the next scale 
up—and the divergent approaches that may be taken within each to 
address climate change. As noted, this divergent analysis was purposefully 
oversimplistic, only intending to demonstrate how each of the two 
dimensions of resource management may play out within each scale. 
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Figure 4 
 
The insights provided in this Article lay a foundation for the next step 
in this research that will undertake a more holistic analysis of the legal 
authority and political action scenarios influencing resource management 
within and across scales. The differing allocations of legal authority among 
jurisdictions (geolegal variations) may make vertical approaches more 
viable than horizontal approaches in some locations and vice versa. These 
geolegal differences come in the form of legal constraints placed either 
on higher-level governmental entities that prevent vertical regulation or 
on higher- or lower-level entities that prevent them from taking 
successful horizontal collective action for resource management. It is our 
hope that further research on the third dimension, which helps 
incorporate legal authority and political action analysis into commons 
resource management, will give rise to a wealth of case-study-based 
research on natural capital management in federal systems, and how that 
management may be improved to avoid commons tragedies across 
vertical and horizontal scales. For example, if a state government legally 
preempts local government authority over resource management, then it 
may prevent local government vertical regulation or horizontal 
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coordination with other local governments, as depicted by B and C 
respectively in Figure 5, below. Yet, as also depicted in Figure 5, other 
local governments in other states may not be legally preempted in such a 
manner and therefore remain free to vertically regulate or horizontally 
coordinate. In the same way, the national government may preempt state 
authority over certain forms of resource management, preventing vertical 
state regulation or horizontal coordination with other states, as depicted 
by D and F in Figure 5. If states, on the other hand, maintain exclusive 
resource management authority under a national constitution, as with the 
Canadian provinces over subnational forest management, then they may 
restrict the nation’s ability to engage in horizontal coordination with 
other nations (E in Figure 5) as well as that nation’s ability to vertically 
regulate (G in Figure 5). These are merely a few general examples. 
Future work will analyze specific cases for specific resources to identify 
potential solutions that can resolve the governance commons dilemma. 
Figure 5 
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Similarly, political differences across jurisdictions (geopolitical 
variations) may make vertical approaches more viable than horizontal 
approaches in some locations and vice versa. For example, and as 
described earlier, simple geopolitics makes vertical regulation of forest 
management policy more politically viable in the Pacific Northwest than in 
the Southeast, where political considerations might block vertical 
regulatory efforts at the state or local government levels, as depicted by F 
and C in Figure 5. In addition, certain countries maintain political climates 
that may block vertical regulatory action, as depicted by G in Figure 5. 
Such is arguably the case in the United States, where the failure of the 
federal government to provide a more uniform approach to forest 
management standards across the nation demonstrates a political choice 
not to even test the waters of its potential legal authority under the 
Constitution. And of course, on any scale, even in the presence of legal 
authority, entities may make political choices not to horizontally 
coordinate their activities (depicted in A, B, D, and E in Figure 5). 
Ultimately, the success of a two-dimensional solution on a given scale 
may vary within and across the scale depending upon the third dimension 
of geolegal and geopolitical variations. Case studies on how these 
scenarios play out within and among different countries will be valuable to 
forging a convergent approach to natural capital management in those 
countries that maximizes the vertical regulatory and horizontal 
coordination opportunities across jurisdictions. 
Not only will future research grapple with the need to account for 
geolegal and geopolitical differences in shaping holistic resource 
management policies, but it will also grapple with the implications of cross-
cutting interactions that “jump scales.” For clarity, in this Article we limit 
our discussion of upper-scale governance to that immediately scaled up 
vertically. That said, we are not suggesting that a single actor functions 
identically at all levels, in that a single private property owner acting on the 
local scale commons may or may not perceive his situation the same when 
framed as acting on the state or national scale commons. Theoretically, as 
demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5, horizontal self-coordination of all private 
property owners across the United States regarding the management of 
certain natural capital could “jump scales” and provide a bottom-up 
solution that resolves the commons dilemma all the way up and across the 
chain (even to the global level if property owners in other nations did the 
same).  
Similarly, at the other extreme, if vertical regulatory coordination 
occurred at the global scale and was successfully implemented, it could 
theoretically resolve commons dilemmas all the way down and across 
scales. Indeed, a single appropriator can act on multiple higher levels—
adding complexity to an already complex multi-layered commons 
structure. For example, the resource units could be natural capital on 
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private property, while the resource system is natural capital present on 
the collection of private properties contained within any higher scale—
whether local, state, federal, or global. So private property owners could 
be herders appropriating resource units of natural capital from local, 
state, federal, and global resource systems simultaneously. Similarly, we 
might characterize states as appropriating resource units of natural 
capital from either a national resource system or the global resource 
system (or both), and so on. 
Yet there may also be geolegal and geopolitical barriers to jumping 
scales. As a result, vertical regulatory coordination and horizontal self-
coordination approaches again may vary depending on the scale and 
region of the country where the policy is instituted. If vertical regulatory 
coordination for a type of natural capital management is prohibited at 
the national scale due to state government reservation of that legal 
authority under the constitution, then horizontal collective action should 
be promoted among states to resolve the commons dilemma until an 
institutional adjustment is made to change the legal authority status quo.  
States may, in turn, work horizontally to harness their individual 
vertical regulatory coordination authority to successfully implement 
proper management down the scale. If all states do so, this may also 
resolve issues up the scale, rendering national vertical regulation 
unnecessary. It may also facilitate that nation’s involvement in a global 
governance arrangement, or make national government involvement in 
such an arrangement unnecessary. Yet the chances of all states doing so 
is unlikely—due primarily to geopolitical considerations. Thus while the 
commons dilemma may be resolved down the scale within a certain 
group of states (Pacific Northwest forests, for example), the national-
scale commons dilemma remains because other herders (states) are 
continuing to appropriate forest resources in a tragic manner. 
Both the geolegal-geopolitical dimension and the jumping-of-scales 
dynamic represent only a few notable observations concerning the 
complexity stemming from the three-dimensional federal governance 
commons. Yet this complexity has stark implications for climate change 
mitigation as actors at every governance scale—local, state, national, and 
global—appropriate natural capital essential to combatting climate 
change. While each commons within and across scales presents a distinct 
body of actors that have diverse perceptions of their respective 
commons, they appropriate the same or similar natural capital resources 
as actors on other scales. In other words, each scale holds several 
potential opportunities to devolve into a tragedy of the commons and 
deplete natural resources necessary to combat climate change, 
irrespective of the actions taken by appropriators at other levels or on 
the same level and dependent very much upon the legal or political 
constraints existing in that scale. Thus a “convergent” approach to 
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natural capital commons management in federal systems becomes 
necessary to fully account for legal constraints that may exist on vertical 
regulation across scales or horizontal collective action within scales, 
geopolitical circumstances positively or negatively impacting political 
action within scales, and the ability of management actions on one scale 
to “jump” to higher or lower scales to resolve commons dilemmas. 
Recognizing the impacts that geolegal constraints and geopolitical 
differences have on the viability of vertical or horizontal policies, a 
convergent approach encourages the proper management of natural 
capital resources by more fully accounting for the complexities of the 
governance commons that is a federal system of government. 
 
